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Whether Chinese social organisations have autonomy has been much debated topic 
from the beginning of 90s. The Western scholars have mainly argued from two 
opposing viewpoints. Civil society approach has emphasised civil society’s autonomous 
nature while corporatist approach has stressed state control and repression. Both 
approaches grasp some features of the Chinese civil society, but they fail to explain how 
Chinese social organisations achieve autonomy.  More recent developments in this area 
have paid attention to special characters of the Chinese system and have helped to 
understand this process more clearly. Chinese scholars have taken different route to 
understanding of the Chinese civil society. They have emphasised the dual nature of 
Chinese social organisations. My aim is to combine these different approaches to the 
more comprehensive understanding of the Chinese social organisations autonomy.    
This Pro Gradu thesis questions prevailing western conception of nongovernmental 
organisations’ autonomy which regards autonomy as independence from the state. 
Instead it proposes a concept of operational autonomy which links organisation’s 
autonomy to its actual performance. This is especially fruitful approach to Chinese 
social organisations which gain autonomy through participating and cooperating with 
governmental organisations, resulting in autonomy which can be conceptualised as 
dependent autonomy. This relation can be best understood through a mass line model 
which encourages social organisations to voluntarily form vertical relations to state and 
party organisations and officials. Participating in mass line style of relationship is also 
essential for social organisations’ private funding. Thus, dependent autonomy is a 
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Ever since Deng Xiaoping launched the economic reforms in 1978, the liberalization 
has been main tenet of the Chinese policy. Even though the path to the destination has 
sometimes been winding and troubled, the overall direction toward greater liberalisation 
of society, institutions, and the economy has been inevitable. These reforms have 
affected Chinese society in remarkable way. Perhaps one of the most notable features 
has been the emancipation of the social space where people have been able to associate 
more spontaneously.  At the same time a quite different tendency has structured Chinese 
society. The state has come more reluctant and/or incapable of carrying out the services 
it used to carry out before the reforms, creating room for voluntary organisations to 
operate in various spheres of society. Due to these tendencies, Chinese society has 
witnessed enormous boom in the number of associations ranging from charities to 
environmental organisations, legal advocacy groups, scientific associations, foundations 
and many more. The most recent available data shows that there is about 600000 
officially registered social organisations (SO) and foundations in China. The number of 
unregistered associations is harder to estimate, but it obviously is multiple to that of 
registered ones.
1 
China’s government certainly has acknowledged SOs’ enormous contribution to China’s 
development during the past forty years, and their role in maintaining social harmony 
now and in the future. Educational, developmental, environmental organisations and 
philanthropic foundations have shared their expertise and knowledge helping to ease 
social discontent and distrust. At the same time, the government is fully aware of civil 
society’s potential to challenge its authority.  This conflict of interests leading to 
opposite directions makes Chinese administration’s attitude toward associations 
ostensibly incoherent and erratic. On the one hand it open-handedly supports 
associations’ operations and activity, on the other hand it restricts their autonomy and 
development and sometimes even cracks down on them and abolishes them. 
The idea to the topic of my thesis came when I was in my first interview trip in China. I 
was going to write a thesis about cooperation between Chinese SOs and private 
companies. I was expecting that Chinese SOs lacked autonomy and their operations 
would be wholly co-operational. To my surprise, I found that some SOs seemed to have 
                                                 
1 China Development Brief Newsletter, May 2016 
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ability to decide their own goals and they acted even against local government’s 
interests, so I became interested how these organisations managed to act autonomously 
even though institutional environment is very restrictive. General misconception with 
regard to Chinese governance is to think it as one colossal unity where different 
departments are pursuing common goals. On the contrary, different state agencies often 
have contradictory goals and they are competing with each other for resources. Kenneth 
Lieberthal has famously labelled this phenomenon as fragmented authoritarianism
2. 
Under fragmented authoritarianism SOs have an opportunity to ally with one 
government organisation and get protection from other government organisations’ 
pressure. The main hypothesis of my study is that through cooperation social 
organisations are recognized by the government officials and thus gain administrative 
legitimacy.  With administrative legitimacy social organisations are able to escape the 
full impact of state control and even gain, at least, limited autonomy. Thus, autonomy 
is dependent on government’s recognition.  
This concept contradicts dominant liberal theories where autonomy is seen as 
organisational autonomy, that is, autonomy as independence from the state. In my thesis 
I suggest a more plausible way of understanding autonomy as operational autonomy, 
which is related to organisations’ performance and how much they are actually able to 
decide their own goals and operations. Operational autonomy is also compatible with 
the idea that Chinese SOs can gain autonomy through cooperation with the state. I have 
borrowed the concept of dependent autonomy from Lu Yiyi
3
 and in this study I 
understand it as operational autonomy which is gained through actively participating 
and cooperating with governmental agencies and thus gaining recognition and support 
from them. However, social organisations cannot be too dependent on governmental 
resources. They need resources from private citizens and companies to make 
themselves more valuable ally for the government and to be able to negotiate more 
operating space from it. Otherwise, they would fall in danger of being fully co-opted by 
the governmental organisation. Thus, dependent autonomy is a complex mix of 
operational autonomy, administrative legitimacy and financial independence. 
In the first chapter I will describe the institutional environment for SOs in the PRC 
starting from the historical account. Some unique characters of Chinese civil society 
have already existed in imperial period. Then I will proceed to cultural, legal and 
                                                 
2 Lieberthal 1992 
3 Lu 2009 
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political framework in which Chinese SOs have to currently operate. Regulations 
concerning the SOs have gone through several steps in the reform era, the most notable 
being 1989 and 1998 legislations. Moreover, the Charity Law and Overseas NGO Law 
were passed in 2016 but their full implication is yet to be seen.  
In the second chapter I will widely examine different civil society models for China. 
Analysing the state-society relationship has proven to be a complicated task. All of the 
models have grasped some essential features of this relationship but, given the 
complexity of Chinese system, it has been difficult to define adequate concepts and to 
form a satisfactory model. I start with civil society and corporatism models. Proponents 
of the civil society approach and Corporatist approach have studied this problem from 
two opposite perspectives. The former has seen the emerging civil society and its 
autonomous and voluntary organisations as determining feature of the Chinese 
nongovernmental sector. The latter have emphasised the top-down control of the state 
over organisations and their activities. Problem of these approaches is that they are 
based on the state-society dichotomy and hence to the concept of organisational 
autonomy. At worst these models make completely contradictory predictions to the 
evidence. To understand the Chinese civil society and how social organisations pursue 
autonomy, we need to develop a model which takes into account the special features of 
Chinese society and politics, a model which is more responsive to the historical and 
cultural characteristics of China. 
Then I proceed to the institutional approach sketched by Christopher Nevitt.4 
Institutional approach elaborates how changing incentives can explain how different 
attitudes of the officials can influence the organisations autonomy. Consultative 
authoritarianism model pays attention to the changing political economy and how it has 
created opportunities for social organisations. Mass line model gives comprehensive 
model how engaging in vertical cooperation with the state organisations will strengthen 
SOs legitimacy and autonomy. At the end of chapter I will examine Chinese scholars’ 
approaches. Sun Taiyi5 has recently sketched an approach, which I call dynamic 
adaptation model. It emphasises the dynamic nature of changing state-society relations 
over time. Equally fruitful notion is the dual nature of Chinese SOs proposed by Sun 
                                                 
4 Nevitt 1996 
5 Sun 2017 
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Liping6. Chinese SOs cannot depend only on governmental resources but they need also 
private resources from citizens and companies. 
In the third chapter I will present my empirical findings and evidence supporting my 
hypothesis. Administrative legitimacy and financial independence have strong 
correlation with operational autonomy which strongly supports my hypothesis that 
connections to the government and private funding are essential resources for SOs 
pursuing autonomy. Moreover, financial independence is highly dependent on 
administrative legitimacy which suggests that administrative legitimacy is primary 
resource and needs to be acquired before social organisations are able to attract private 
donations and gain financial independence. 
 
Institutional Environment 
Institutional environment determines the boundaries where SOs are able to operate. It 
includes formal rules such as laws and regulations but also informal customs and 
conventions. In China determining the institutional environment is challenging because 
often there is no articulated rules what is allowed and what is forbidden. Moreover, 
different SOs are treated differently according to how useful they are for the 
government and how much authority challenging potential they have. 
China is said to be culturally unique and cultural features determine partly which kind 
of institutions emerge in the society. I will briefly elaborate some features and concepts 
which have relation to my study. 
 There is much discussion how much this cultural uniqueness affects the way how the 
relation between people and the state is understood in China. According to Ma Qiusha, 
much of the attention has been paid to the classical teachings and their conceptions of 
this relationship. It has been pointed out that in Chinese classical teachings and culture 
there is no such sharp distinction between the state and society or public and private as 
there is in Western thinking. In Chinese culture people are seen as the source of 
legitimacy of the state and at the same time subjected to it. According to Ma this 
classical understanding of people and their relationship to the state has strongly affected 
how Chinese people see this relationship even today. Some scholars have suggested that 
civil society is not possible in countries with strong Confucian influence. However, Ma 
points out that, these viewpoints overemphasise Confucianism’s influence on Chinese 
                                                 
6 Lu 2009, 19 
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society and politics and do not take into account social and political development in 
modern China.7 
Another concept which is often said to be unique to China is the concept of guanxi, 
which can be depicted as social network of influence. Guanxi is based on reciprocal 
exchange of favours or services and trust and it is essential part of any social, financial 
or political intercourse in China. Closely related concept is mianzi (面子), “face”, which 
refers to social status or prestige. Face can be given to others and it is important aspect 
of creating and maintaining guanxi. Below, I will introduce a concept of political credit 
which is equivalent of face in the political context and it is essential part of social 
organisations which want to pursue and maintain connections to officials.  
 
 
Dependent legitimacy: Chinese SOs in Pre-Revolutionary Era 
 
According to Gordon White’s studies there were more than 26,125 civil organisations 
with more than 5.5 million members in Nationalist-controlled areas of China in 1944.8 
Although scholars might disagree whether we can call it a genuine civil society, it is 
undisputed fact that there were organisations run by citizens which enjoyed at least 
partial autonomy from the state and that civil society was at least emerging and it had 
certain qualities which are essential for it to exist.   
For example, Pearson states that the Late Qing and early Republic era urban community 
was characterised by lively associational life which was composed of professional 
guilds, trade associations, chambers of commerce and study societies which were 
financially independent and relatively autonomous in their area of profession. For 
example, guilds could freely organise production and marketing of commodities and 
decide who could carry on business in the area of their operation
9
. According to Ma 
Qiusha, especially chambers of commerce (from 1904 onwards) and study societies 
played an important role in China’s economic and political life and presented similar 
characteristics to that of modern Chinese SOs in many ways. They were formally 
established, they had well-defined organisational missions and membership 
requirements, and they were run according to managerial principles. Contrary to 
                                                 
7 Ma 2006, 27-28 
8 White 1996, 19 
9 Ma 2006, 37-38 
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traditional professional guilds and trade associations, their membership was voluntary 
and not limited to any profession, locality or trade. Thus, these associations presented 
more broadly social interests than the old associations. Many of these new associations 
were also run democratically. Board of trustees were responsible for ensuring the 
fulfilment of organisations’ missions and all the leaders were elected. Moreover, every 
member over 20 years was authorised to vote in elections.
10 
However, associations and guilds were dependent on state for their legitimacy. 
According to Pearson, business and especially trade was considered as morally inferior 
and illegitimate in late Qing period. To gain legitimacy, guilds provided public services 
on behalf of the state such as firefighting and maintenance of communal infrastructure. 
Thus, state and associations were in symbiotic relationship. Associations took care of 
state’s responsibilities and state reciprocally conveyed legitimacy to the organisations.
11 
Even though there were growing conflicts of interests between weak government and 
the bourgeoise which reflected to the relationship of the state and civil society, their 
relationship was not confrontational in essence. A Chinese historian, Ma Min has 
pointed out that “The purpose of early Chinese civil society was not to confront the 
government, but rather to harmonize the relations between society and the government. 
This point was mutually accepted by both the government and society.”
12 
According to Ma Qiusha this intimate and interdependent relation to the state is the 
most striking and controversial feature of Chinese associations then and today. Some 
historians call this relation constructively interactive because it is based on mutual 
interests and interdependence.
13
 From another point of view, Pearson thinks that Chinese 
associations were and are best characterised as having dualist, or as she puts it, Janus-
faced nature. Associations are directed toward the state and society at the same time.
14 
Despite these differences, the circumstances in the first half of the twentieth century 
were different than today.  Chinese associations today confront relatively strong state 
which controls effectively many aspects of the society. Late Qing and Republican era 
governments were weak and their ability to control civil society was remarkably weaker 
than the party-state today. It is also notable that associations in early twentieth century 
                                                 
10 Ma 2006, 37-38 
11 Pearson 1994, 26-28 
12 Ma 2006, 46 
13 Ma 2006, 40,41 
14 Pearson 1994, 26-28 
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were politically extremely active in struggling against imperialism and “building new 
China”. Modern Chinese NGOs, on the contrary, avoid politically sensitive issues and 
declare themselves to be apolitical. State also discourages actions which could be 
interpreted as political. From the governments perspective civil society’s role in 
building new China should be restricted to maintaining social harmony and thus 
contributing to economic growth and international leverage.
15   
After the Communist victory, the associational situation was changed dramatically. 
Communist Party rapidly abolished or merged almost all the social organisations to the 
party-state system and the few remaining independent organisations were tightly 
controlled by the Communist Party.
16 
Distinctive feature of the system was that society and its relation to the state was 
arranged vertically. All the members of society were hierarchically incorporated into the 
state system through work units danwei (单位) in the cities and agricultural collectives 
jiti (集体) in the countryside. These organisations controlled almost every aspect of 
human life from organising health and child care, housing, schools, shops, post offices 
to giving permission to travelling, marriage and having children. This system restricted 
individuals and groups to one system and discouraged horizontal organisation between 
different social groups.
17
 In other words, this so-called mass line tactics was a form of 
vertical communication system designed for implementing and enforcing party politics 
to the masses. On the other hand, it also created an instrument for bottom-up 
information flow, "transmission belt" from the grass-roots level to the central agencies. 
As I will argue later in this thesis, this vertical structure of state-society relationship is 
still encouraged by the state even though it is not enforced. State considers civil 
organisations as illegitimate but through cooperation and being good partner for 
government agencies organisations are able to gain legitimacy. The survival and 
development of organisations are essentially dependent on how they are able to gain 
legitimacy from government agencies. Thus, civil associations do not consider them as 
opponents of the government but rather an ally. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Ma 2006, 40-46 
16 Heurlin 2010, 232; White 1996, 19 





In general, civil society is regarded as composed of all civil relations which lie outside 
of the government, or commercial system. It might also be called third sector because of 
its intermediary role between the government (first sector) and economy (second 
sector.) Dictionary definition states that civil society is the ”aggregate of non-
governmental organisations and institutions that manifest interests and will of citizens” 
Whether there is true civil society in China is naturally dependent on the definition of 
civil society. According to Jonathan Unger, there are there three current definitions of 
civil society. Some neo-liberal scholars have equated civil society with market 
economy. Market economy provides a safeguard for society where individual freedoms 
are respected. Consequently, civil society is protected best by defending market 
capitalism against state intervention.18 
Another definition emphasises civil society’s connection to the liberal democracy. 
Proponents of this conception claims that civil society is a prerequisite for democracy. 
According to Unger these scholars usually list some properties which they consider 
essential for democratization and then equates it with the civil society. At best, this 
argument seems to beg the question.19 
Third definition emphasises autonomous organisations and their role in creating vibrant 
civil society. This conception shares with the two previously mentioned conceptions the 
idea that more open society is desirable, but it does not presuppose liberal democracy or 
market capitalism. This conception is compatible even with the authoritarian regime and 
planned economy as long it allows autonomous social organisations to exist.20 
In mainland China there is no established way to talk about civil society. It is mainly 
referred by three different but overlapping concepts: shimin shehui (市民社会), 
gongmin shehui (公民社会), and minjian shehui (民间社会). Each of them has 
slightly different connotation. According to Yu Keping shimin shehui is widely used and 
it derives its traditional meaning from the Chinese translations of classical Marxist texts. 
From this traditional meaning it might derive also some negative connotation. Some 
people might equate it with the term ”bourgeois society.” Further confusion is possible 
                                                 
18 Unger 2008, 3 
19 Unger 2008, 3 
20 Unger 2008, 3-4 
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as the primary meaning of shimin is city resident and some people may identify it with 
urban residents only.
21   
Minjian shehui has moreneutral connotation and it has been widely used by researchers 
studying Chinese civil society in a Modern China. Gongmin shehui has been adopted 
after the reform and opening up. Direct translation is citizen society and it has positive 
connotation. It emphasises political aspect of the term, that is citizens' participation and 
citizens' restrains on state power. According to Yu Keping, gongmin shehui has been 
adopted more and more often especially by young researchers.
22  
This could be sign of 
Chinese civil society being gradually politicised.  
Both latter concepts can be translated as civil society as long as it is remembered that 
Chinese civil society has its own characteristics and cannot be equated with Western 
civil society as discussed further below. 
 
Terminology of Chinese Civil Society Organisations 
 
There are many overlapping names for organisations operating in public sphere which 
emphasise different aspects of them such as non-governmental organisations (NGO), 
non-profit organisations (NPO), intermediary organisations, third-sector organisations, 
voluntary organisations, or mass organisations. 
The term non-profit organisation feiyingli zuzhi (非营利组织) emphasises 
organisation’s non-commercial nature.  It distinguishes them from enterprises and 
companies which operate in the markets.
23
 However, there is a possible source of 
ambiguity. Many organisations which do not receive funding from government or from 
the private persons may have to charge from the services they provide in order to 
survive and develop. What distinguishes non-profit organisations from companies is that 
they do not return the profits to their directors or owners.  NPOs must return the profits 
back to the basic mission of the organisation. 
Intermediary organisation zhongjie zuzhi (中介组织) is the most favoured term used by 
government organisations and it is commonly used in administrative regulations. It 
makes explicit that civil society organisations occupy the intermediary position between 
                                                 
21 Yu 2011, 64-65 
22 Yu 2011, 65 
23 Yu 2011, 66 
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the markets and government but leaves organisation’s non-profit nature unclear. Yu 
Keping has pointed out that, many of the organisations which are viewed by 
administrative agencies as intermediary organisations, are actually profit-making bodies 
and are more closely related to the markets than the civil society.
24 
The terms mass organisation qunzhong tuanti (群众团体) and the people's organisation 
renmin tuanti (人民团体) are deeply rooted in a current political system. These 
organisations are directly led by the Communist Party and their staff is appointed by the 
government. They are strongly political in nature and they perform certain 
administrative tasks on behalf of the government. Mass organisation and people’s 
organisation are sometimes used in more general sense to refer to all organisation 
operating in the public sphere but for the sake of clarity it might be more reasonable to 
refer mass organisations only to semi-governmental organisations such as Communist 
Youth League, All-China Federation of Trade Unions, All-China Women's Federation, 
and All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce. Trade unions can also be regarded 
as mass organisations.
25 
The term third sector organisation disanbumen zuzhi (第三部门组织) has been 
relatively recently introduced in the Chinese academic discussion of civil society. It is 
abstract technical term which can also be misinterpreted as an economic three-sector 
theory's tertiary sector (services.) The term volunteer organisation zhiyuan zuzhi (志愿
组织) has an obvious problem too. It emphasises the voluntary nature of civil 
organisations, but volunteering is not exclusively civil society organisations’ 
characteristic. According to Yu, many party organisations in China also stress their 
voluntary nature.
26 
Non-governmental organisation feizhengfu zuzhi (非政府组织) is widely used in 
present discussion but civil society activist themselves avoid using it because feizhengfu 
can be interpreted as “anti-governmental”. However, many of the organisations use 
English abbreviation NGO instead. Its connotation emphasises organisations formal 
independence from the government. As I shall argue later, there is a fuzzy line between 
civil society and the government in China and the formal independence may not be the 
most relevant character in explaining the behaviour of the civil society organisations. 
                                                 
24 Yu, 2011, 67 
25 Yu 2011, 67 
26 Yu 2011, 68 
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The term originates from Western liberal theories of civil society and the usage of the 
term suggests that NGOs have confrontational nature towards the state. 
Social organisation, minjian zuzhi (民间组织) is the broadest term denoting Chinese 
civil society organisations. Direct translations of them would be ‘among the people 
organisation’ or ‘citizen-initiated organisation’. Perhaps the best translation would be a 
“civic organisation”. The concept of civic organisation emphasises organisation’s 
societal basis. It has emerged among the people and is managed by citizens. However, 
the Chinese term is used to denote very different organisations in China and some of 
them are run by government. Thus, I prefer to translate it as social organisation. This 
concept emphasises the purpose of the organisation. Social organisations purpose is to 
produce some common or public good. This concept leaves open its relation to the 
government and can refer also to government-organised social organisation as long it 
functions like social organisation. Civic organisation could perhaps be used more 
naturally for grassroots organisations as they are usually genuinely run by private 
citizens. 
Officially registered social organisations shehui tuanti (社会团体) are subdivision of 
social organisations. I use social association (SA) to distinguish it from general term 





Douglas C. North, an important researcher on institutions and proponent of New 
Institutionalism has defined institutions as: “...[] humanly devised constrains that 
structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal 
constrains (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal 
rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)” He also states that institutions have been 
devised throughout history to create order and reduce uncertainty in social, economic 
and political exchange.
27
 Thus, institutions tend to be relatively stable and long lasting. 
According to Yu Keping, institutions can be explicitly announced and enforced by 
authoritative bodies like statutory regulations or they can implicitly restrict people’s 
                                                 
27 North 1991, 97 
18/85 
 
behaviour like codes of conduct or social norms. Political institution is a compilation of 
regulations which restrict people’s political behaviour and thus defines people’s sphere 
of political action. As political institutions are usually established and reinforced by the 
state and they represent the basic interests and values of current political authority, they 
are the most overriding institutions.
28 
Although most of the social organisations claim to be apolitical in a sense that they do 
not pursue political power or try to challenge current political authority, in a more 
general sense civil activism can hardly be seen as unpolitical. Especially environmental 
SOs have goals which can be seen as political in nature. They have variety of 
environmental goals and they sometimes engage in policy advocacy. Thus, social 
organisations’ activities should be structured by political institutions. 
In China, institutional environment of civil society is the aggregate of informal and 
formal regulations shaping social organisations’ activities. According to Yu Keping this 
institutional environment has five aspects. First, civil society is structured by the 
constitution which provides the fundamental legal framework and legitimacy. Second, 
ordinary laws stipulate the specific and comprehensive rules on civil organisations’ 
behaviour. Third, administrative regulations imposed by central and local governments. 
Fourth, party policy regulations affect SOs, and fifth, informal institutions, that is, 
implicit rules disseminated in the society and the government also play their role.
29 
Since political and legal institutions have manifold influence on social organisations’ 
behaviour and development through supervision, guidance, financial policies, control 
etc. It is important to analyse these different factors in detail. In the following chapters I 
will examine some relevant features of China’s institutional environment for civil 
society. 
 
Institutional Environment and Social Horizontalisation 
 
From the 1950's until the beginning of the reforms and opening up, interaction between 
the society and the state was organised vertically. The party-state allowed only one 
government organised mass organisation for any given social field to represent citizens’ 
interests. Most of the social activity was directed through work units and mass 
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organisations which were permeated by the party-state system and there was no room 
for voluntary social organisations. However, economic reforms and decentralisation 
starting in the end of 1970s' changed the institutional environment to more beneficial to 
the civil society. The constitution promulgated in 1982 assured the freedom of 
association for citizens. It diminished the significance of work units and mass 
organisation and brought down their monopoly of interest representation. Chinese 
scholar Gao Bingzhong describes this change as a shift from vertical to horizontal 
pattern of social organisation, as it allowed people to organise themselves horizontally.
30 
One particularly important condition for the emergence of civil society is that people are 
free to associate horizontally without repression or repressive social control. They have 
opportunity for open political dialogue, free association and freedom of speech.
31
  
Despite some backlash in recent years, in overall, social organisations in China have 
gained more freedom and greater autonomy in the past thirty-five years as the 
associational spectrum of Chinese society has become more pluralistic. Many important 
policies formulated by the Communist party such as promoting market economy, 
structural reforms, separation of government and business, and establishing the rule by 
law have created room for functional civil society. Moreover, as Xie Lei has pointed 
out, the Chinese government has increasingly emphasised social management as a way 
to ease current social tensions and the cooperation between the state and social 
organisations has been officially regarded as part of the social management
32
.  On the 
other hand, Chinese government believes that regulation of civil society is vital to 
maintain the stability of the society. The basic orientation of laws and regulations 
promulgated by governmental agencies are restrictive and supervisory. They mostly 
erect obstacles and hindrances for the development of social organisations. The unique 
feature in the Chinese system is that while restricting civil society, it at the same time 
permits and even encourages collective citizen action, as long as such actions do not 
undermine the legitimacy of central government or jeopardise social harmony. As Yu 
Keping puts it, the institutional environment of Chinese civil society in macro level is 
generally encouraging, but in micro level it is restricting.
33 
 
                                                 
30 Keith 2003, 38-39; Gao 2001, 73; Yu 2011, 78 
31 Keith 2003, 39; Yaziji & Doh 2009, 27 
32 Xie 2009, 49 
33 He 2012, 1-2; Yu 2011, 79 
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Registration and Dual Supervision System 
 
The horizontal development of Chinese society was halted and turned back after 1989 
demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. Before 1989 any state or party agency could 
approve and take charge of social organisations but after 1989 the government 
centralised the registration of social organisations and stipulated regulation that all 
social organisations should be registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) in 
Beijing or with local civil affairs bureau or office. Before registration, social 
organisations are required to find a state or party organisation as its professional 
administrative unit yewu zhuguan danwei (业务主管单位). Professional administrative 
unit assumes political responsibility for inspecting the activities and finances of SOs 
and it must be in the same field as the supervised organisation. The professional 
administrative unit is especially responsible for that SO does not take part in any illegal 
or anti-governmental activities. This forms the basis of system of dual administration 
shuangchong guanli (双重管理).34 However, system of dual administration is not 
applied consistently in all provinces and for example Guangdong province has gradually 
laxed the regulation and allows all social organisations to apply registration status 
without finding a professional administrative unit first.35 
In addition, there are two regulations which restrict the civil organisations’ registration: 
”The non-competition principle” feijingzheng yuanze( 非竞争原则), stipulates that in 
the same professional field within the same administrative level, only one social 
association can be registered. The other one is ”multi-level management system” fenji 
guanli (分级管理) in which SOs with nationwide activities are regulated at the national 
level and SOs with local activities are regulated at the local level. For example, an 
organisation registered in Beijing has to restrict its activities and their impact in Beijing. 
An organisation registered at national level is allowed to operate nationwide.
36 
These two exclusive regulations and the system of dual administration effectively limit 
the development and growth of SOs. Moreover, the state and party organisations are not 
interested taking burden of responsibility of other organisations’ actions unless there is 
some mutual benefit or personal ties between organisations. The requirements for 
registering with MCA or local civil affair bureaus are high especially at the national 
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level and it is difficult to register as a social organisation without government backing. 
As a result, many registered social associations have some kind of government 
background or are established by the government. There are little possibilities for 
voluntary based civic organisations to obtain formal registration with the MCA.37  
Consequently, the organisational spectrum of Chinese civil society consists of a 
substantial number of social organisations that fail to apply for formal registration with 
the MCA or its local agencies. 
In 1998, State Council amended new regulation concerning registration of 
organisations. This amendment gave recognition to new kind of social organisations 
such as private non-enterprise organisations and foundations. After this regulation, SOs 
has been divided in four categories: social associations, private non-enterprise units 
(After 2016 Charity Law Social Service Organisations, SSO), foundations and the 
branches of international SOs and foundations.38 
Some organisations which are not able or willing to register with MCA but still want to 
obtain legal status may register themselves as non-profit enterprises (NPE) with the 
Bureau of Industry and Commerce (BIC). They are considered as enterprises, even 
though they are engaged in non-profit and public good activities. They suffer some 
disadvantages compared to SAs registered with MCA. For example, non-profit 
enterprises are not granted tax exemptions. However, most of the social organisations 
continue their activities as unregistered. These organisations, though not legal as such, 
are still sometimes able to continue their activities without interference. On the other 
hand, their prospect of development and growth are poor. They are not able to open 
bank account and they are not allowed to solicit public donations. Thus, their ability to 
manage funding and development of their operations are more or less hampered by 
institutional constraints.39 
The fact that grassroots organisations are not under continuous supervision of 
government agencies may lead one to think that they are more autonomous and 
independent from governmental guidance than formally registered organisations. This is 
not a case, legal status and governmental connections gives registered organisations 
certain protection from governmental harassment. On the contrary, lacking such 
protection makes grassroots organisations more vulnerable to interference or even 
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crackdown in case they happen to step on some government agency’s toes. As we shall 
see below, governmental connections are useful resources which help social 
organisations to navigate through the pitfalls of the system and enjoy relatively strong 
autonomy in setting their own agenda. 
 
Legal Classification of Social Organisations 
 
An inevitable consequence of the given institutional environment is that there are great 
variety of social organisations with different legal status which enjoy various legal and 
political rights and privileges. For example, registration status determinates SOs access 
to certain resources and benefits such as tax exemptions. Registration status also affects 
actual space where organisation is able to operate. 
On general level organisations can be distinguished as formal and informal. The former 
consists of all the registered organisations whether they have registered with MCA or 
some other state agency and organisations which have gained recognition by the 
authorities otherwise. The latter consists of organisations which are not registered or 
exempted from registration but continue their operations in a grey area. According to the 
registration system, social organisations can be divided in four distinctive legal 
categories. First, there are organisations which are exempted from registration. These 
include eight mass organisations such as All-China Women's Federation and Communist 
Youth League. These organisations cannot be counted as genuine SOs as they are 
initiated by the government and they perform administrative functions on its behalf. 
Another group of organisations exempted from registration regulation are those which 
operate internally to, and are approved by, administrative agencies, social organisations 
or enterprises. For example, university student unions are not under an obligation to 
register with MCA as long as they are approved by their hosting universities and they 
operate within the university. Under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
there are four types of organisations. The first group are social associations which, 
according the State Council, are “non-profit social organisations voluntarily organised 
by Chinese citizens to achieve the common objectives of their members by engaging in 
activities in accordance with their charters.”40 
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The second group under MCA jurisdiction are second-level civic organisations erji 
shetuan (二级社团) or branches fenzhi jigou (分支机构.) of registered organisations. 
Organisations which do not meet the qualifications of registration system can seek to 
persuade registered organisation to let them hang under their umbrella. In 
compensation, these second level organisations usually pay host organisations annual 
management fee. According to Lu, these management fees were in fact a significant part 
of funding for many registered organisations. Before 1998, second level organisations 
did not need to be registered with MCA, but the 1998 regulations changed the situation 
and now also they need to register with MCA. However, the registration requirements 
are somewhat looser than for first tier organisations.41 
The third group under MCA jurisdiction consists of social service organisations (private 
non-enterprise units before 2016 Charity law). According to the 1998 regulations, they 
are “social organisations without governmental funding organised by enterprises, 
institutions, social associations, other social forces or individual citizens for the purpose 
of engaging not-for-profit social service activities.”42 
The fourth group are foundations dedicated to the public good. According to the 1998 
regulations, they are “non-profit legal persons that use funds contributed by natural or 
legal persons or other organisations to carry out undertakings for the public good.”43 
The third category of social organisations consists only of those organisations which are 
registered as non-profit enterprises with the Bureau of Industry and Commerce. The 
fourth category consists of all non-registered and informal groups and associations. In 
addition to grassroots organisations it includes internet-based communities, religious 
groups, urban and rural communities and so on. In this category I have restricted my 
study only formally organised grassroots organisations. 
The figure 1 below shows the spectrum of social organisations in China according to 
their legal status. 
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Figure 1) legal classification of social organisations 
 
In my thesis I regard all other organisations but mass organisations in the above figure 
as the object of my study. Mass organisations clearly function more like state organs. 
Intra-unit associations might in some cases qualify as social organisations. Lu Yiyi has 
stated, that intra-unit associations do not necessarily confine their activities in the 
premises of their mother organisations and they often have their own agenda. She gives 
an example of very active student environmental group at Beijing Forestry University, 
which has cooperated with other environmental groups and organised activities such as 
environmental awareness campaigns, conferences and wild animal protection 
activities.44 Thus it is worthwhile to regard these groups as objects of my study as well. 
In my sample there is only one intra-unit association and it clearly qualifies as an 
autonomous group with its own agenda. 
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Institutional Space vs. Actual Space 
 
Institutional space understood as a space which is confined by the regulatory laws and 
regulations is much smaller than the actual space where social organisations operate. 
Obvious evidence for that is the number of actually existing social organisations which 
exceeds considerably the number of registered social organisations. According to China 
Statistical Year book, in 2016 there were 303.393 social organisations registered 
formally with the MCA. Above that, there are non-profit enterprises registered with the 
Bureau of Industry and Commerce and unregistered organisations. It is impossible to 
determine the exact number of social organisations in China because there is no reliable 
statistics on that. However, in 2005 Wang Ming estimated that the total number of SOs 
in China was between 2 and 2.7 million.
45
 Tian Yongjun has estimated that more than 
80% of the social organisations in China are “extra-legal”.46 
According to Yu Keping, an interesting feature of Chinese civil society’s institutional 
environment is that formally registered social organisations seem to enjoy the smallest 
institutional space. The regulatory laws and supervisory system restrict their operations 
most. On the other hand, the organisations exempted from registration and grassroots 
organisations enjoy the greatest amount of institutional space.
47  
This does not 
necessarily mean that formally registered organisations have less actual space. Quite 
contrary they seem to enjoy often more actual space than those which are not registered, 
such as grassroots organisations. Registered social associations and social organisations 
with good connections to government officials are able to stretch their actual space 
beyond their institutional space. On the other hand, grassroots organisations may have 
to restrict their actual behaviour to be able to survive. 
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From Partial Legitimacy to Full Legitimacy 
 
According to Tian Yongjun, legitimacy is an intangible asset of the social organisation. 
It is a necessary condition of organisation’s stable and long-lasting development. 
According to him, in order to gain legitimacy, an organisation must gain governments 
and society’s recognition and trust.
48 
Gao Bingzhong goes deeper in his analysis of legitimacy. He also provides interesting 
explanation of the gap between actual and institutional space of Chinese social 
organisations. According to him, the law and regulations are not the only source of 
legitimacy. He claims that social organisations in present day China do not need to gain 
full legitimacy in order to survive. They are able to survive if they gain only partial 
legitimacy. Besides legal legitimacy which derives from organisations legal position as 
a registered organisation, full legitimacy consists of three other forms of legitimacy, 
namely, social legitimacy, administrative legitimacy, and political legitimacy. Thus, civil 





Social legitimacy presupposes at least some kind of recognition or even participation by 
the people. According to Gao, social legitimacy is based on local tradition, local 
common interest, or common understanding of the local values and principles. Gao 
gives an example of an association which carried on tradition of dragon tablet fair in 
Fanzhuang village in Hebei Province. The tradition has very long history, but 
Communist Party considered it as heretical and feudal superstitious which should be 
abolished in the modern era. All ritual activities and worship were suppressed especially 
during the heydays of the Cultural Revolution, but even after the beginning of the 
reform officials continued suspicious attitude towards the tradition. However, the 
dragon tablet fair was based on local tradition and enjoyed strong support from the 
people.
50  
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Moreover, the Dragon Tablet Fair Association was able to gather monetary donations 
and other material offerings from the worshippers and these donations were used to 
promote local public welfare. Financial support was given for example to primary 
schools and households suffering hardships. The Dragon Tablet Fair Association also 
helped to develop local markets and benefitting local welfare. Thus, the association had 
a strong social legitimacy based on tradition, shared values of the community and 
common interest, and even though it was lacking full legitimacy, it was able to continue 
and develop its operation and pursue for greater legitimacy. However, as Gao points out, 
social legitimacy can guarantee only limited operational space for organisation. Usually 
their operations are limited to a small area such as villages like in our example, or just 
one road and to a specific course of action. Within these limits their operations are 
usually approved by officials, but were the organisation to extend its operations or its 
influence beyond these limits it would have to gain more legitimacy or otherwise it 
would fall into problems.
51 
According to Gao, social legitimacy is essential not only for the founding of the 
organisation but also to its development. If the association is unable to gain social 
legitimacy, it is almost impossible for it to obtain resources for its operations, let alone 
raise funds needed for the registration process.
52 
While social legitimacy described by Gao is essential for the organisations in their early 
stage, it is not sufficient for the later development. Lu Yiyi makes distinction to other 
kind of social legitimacy which she calls legitimacy in the eyes of society. By that she 
means credibility and trustworthiness of the organisation in the eyes of their supporters, 
donors and general public. This legitimacy does not depend on shared values and norms 
but organisation’s connections to state apparatus. Connections to the government assure 
the public that organisation is able to carry out its mission and pursue its goals, and 
would not be wiped away any possible conflict with officials. According to Lu, this does 
not apply only to the Chinese public but also to foreign companies often base their 
decision to fund certain organisation on the knowledge whether organisations have 
connections to the government or not.
53
  
I will later demonstrate that connectedness to the government and financial 
independence has a strong correlation. Organisations which have good relations with the 
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government have credibility in the eyes of society and thus they are also able to receive 
more donations. This connectedness I will call administrative legitimacy and I will 




By administrative legitimacy I mean recognition of the organisation or its activities by 
individual party leaders or high-ranking government officials. In 1998, Peking 
University conducted a survey of its alumni associations. From that data, Gao 
Bingzhong found out that only 23% of the total 38 organisations were registered with 
the MCA. Other organisations never applied for registration, or their applications were 
turned down.  He also noted that without exception the top posts of these registered 
organisations were held by local high-ranking officials. Thus, the positions of the 
leaders of these registered organisations were a crucial explanation of their successful 
registration.
54 
In cases mentioned above, the organisations acquired administrative legitimacy through 
the government officials’ participation. In, general, participation can be either symbolic, 
such as nomination as an honorary chairman, or actual, such as being a member in 
organisation’s board. Essential is that this participation connects organisation to the 
administrative system. Organisation can gain administrative legitimacy also if it is 
permitted to take part in government organised activities. Some of the organisations 
even perform administrative tasks on behalf of governmental organisation.
55
 
Recognition can also take more subtle ways. In that respect, the Project Hope of China 
Youth Development Foundation (CYDF) is a good example. CYDF was able to use 
their good connections to persuade many top state leaders to write inscriptions for the 
Project Hope, including the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. Thus, besides being a 
source of information and other resources, governmental connections serves as a label 
for the public showing that certain organisation is trustworthy, legal and safe. On the 
other hand, it shows that organisation has powerful allies and any potential enemy 
would have to think twice before making troubles for them.
56 
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In order to gain and maintain administrative legitimacy, an organisation needs to keep 
contact with officials and report constantly of their activities. By keeping good relations 
to administration, social organisations are able to operate and develop within the 
effective range of that administrative unit even if they completely lack legal 
legitimacy.
57 
According to Gao, administrative legitimacy has particular significance to the Chinese 
organisations and their development because organisations’ management in China is 
basically an extension of the administrative system of the state. Administrative 
legitimacy is usually associated with organisations registered with the MCA, or other 
ministries and organisations under the umbrella of registered organisation. 
Administrative legitimacy is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for any 
organisation willing to gain legal legitimacy. According to the regulations, organisations 
which want to enter the registration process, need to find a professional administrative 
agency as their supervisory unit. Thus, if organisation does not have such administrative 
connections which convey it administrative legitimacy, it lacks qualifications to become 
a registered organisation.
58 
Administrative legitimacy is even more important to intra-unit organisations because 
law entrusts the umbrella organisation full authority over the management of its 
subsidiary organisations. Therefore, the administrative and legal functions are united 
under the same supervising agency. Usually intra-unit organisations reside in 
universities, biggest colleges having dozens of student organisations under their 
supervision. Some universities have formulated even special regulations to enforce the 
management of their associations.
59 
Administrative legitimacy is less important for grassroots organisations. Grassroots 
organisations have social legitimacy, so they are capable of operating in certain limited 
area. However, local officials may expect certain amount of cooperation from them, too. 
Grassroots organisations can also utilise participation in governmental activities to 
overcome their grassroots nature and extend their operations. Any evidence of 
participation such as photographs, banners or certificates can be conceived as 
recognition by the administrative organisation and thus utilised to extend a kind of 
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vague administrative legitimacy which could be regarded also as political recognition of 
their activities.
60 
According to Gao, administrative legitimacy of a social organisation and the 
administrative legitimacy of their activities have different basis. A social organisation 
can gain administrative legitimacy in a single event such as when registered 
organisation accepts it as a second-tier organisation under its umbrella, or it finds a 
professional administrative unit required for the registration process. However, 
organisation’s activities can gain administrative legitimacy only gradually. This is 
because organisations activities can span administrative agencies’ jurisdiction or it can 
change between different agencies territory. From this point of view, it does not matter 
whether it is a registered or intra-unit organisation. If an organisation plans to develop 
its activities, they need continuously contact and deal with various agencies and try to 
achieve cadres’ approval and support.
61 
According to Gao, social organisations’ development is dependent on how effectively 
they are able to use administrative resources. Normally this depends much on assisting 
agency’s official’s position and power. In his studies of Beijing University alumni 
organisations, Gao found that organisations had variety of circumstances. Some of them 
were registered, some were not. Some organised mutual meetings, some just held 
nominal positions in organisation’s executive board. Administrative system entrusts 
associations certain administrative legitimacy. Every agency or branch is an essential 





Political legitimacy is an essential part of the legitimacy. It involves organisation’s 
internal qualities such as organisation’s purpose, intention and significance of its 
activities. Political legitimacy indicates that organisation and its activities are 
conforming to the political standards and norms. In other words, political legitimacy is 
manifestation of its   adherence to ”political correctness” zhengzhi shang zhengque (政
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治上正确). Organisations are able to set up their own agenda and if it is accepted by the 
government or the party offices it will gain political legitimacy.
63 
According to Gao, political legitimacy is fundamental for the existence and the 
development of social organisations. He claims that every organisation operating in 
China’s social space must, in the first hand, resolve the problem of political legitimacy 
and lay particular emphasis on adapting to the local administrative patterns. 
Organisations should consider them as the extensions of the state’s administrative 
system. Administrative systems’ purpose is to safeguard political order and thus any 
organisation pursuing for full legitimacy must meet the political standards. Only under 
these circumstances administrative leaders are motivated to let organisations to use 
administrative resources under their control and help organisations to develop their 
activities. Even registered organisations which have already proven their political 
correctness should pay attention to maintaining political legitimacy. Supervisory 
agencies continuously assess organisations’ political legitimacy and responses 
accordingly. If organisation fails to follow the path of political correctness, supervisory 
agency would react and possibly withdraw its backing causing organisation to lose its 
registration status.  Grassroots organisations which lack legal and administrative 
protection usually appeal to social legitimacy to avoid investigation and pressure from 
the law-enforcing agencies but if they fail to do that, they still may successfully appeal 
to political legitimacy as a last resort.
64
 
Precisely, because political legitimacy is so essential, some of the organisations also 
pursue political legitimacy by voluntarily assuming state organisations’ functions and 
administrative responsibilities. Many organisations for example have written into their 
rules that they will carry out policies and guiding principles introduced by the political 
leaders. Organisations have to continuously create their political correctness. 
On the other hand, as Gao rightly notes, requirements of political correctness severely 
limit organisation’s ability to criticize and oppose the political system and elite.
65
 
Therefore, even if the plurality and autonomy of the Chinese civil society is rising, it is 
difficult to see it as a democratisation process. 
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Autonomy of Chinese Social Organisations 
 
For many liberal scholars, autonomy is the key concept in understanding social 
organisations and their development.66 No wonder that the registration and dual 
administration system raise questions whether Chinese social organisations have 
autonomy, and if they have, to what extent they have. Moreover, as I described in 
previous chapters, Chinese social organisations intentionally seek contacts with the 
government agencies. Most liberal scholars would say that Chinese SOs lack autonomy 
or they do have very limited autonomy. The reason for this is perhaps that they look at 
officially organised organisations which are under the government control. Officially 
registered social associations which are under the dual management system are 
controlled by professional administrative agencies, which are responsible for a wide 
variety of tasks concerning organisation's activities, for example supervising financial 
and personnel management, research activities, contacts with foreign organisations, how 
much they receive international funding and how it is used. If the organisation does not 
comply with the regulations, it might lose its status and be banned. Thus, the current 
legal framework seems to severely restrict organisational autonomy of the officially 
registered organisations.
67 
According to Lu, this understanding of autonomy rests on two false assumptions. First, 
the governmental policy is confused with actual practise. Second, government support is 
confused with control. Neither of the assumptions is warranted by the evidence. Even if 
governmental policies are strict, it does not mean that government is always capable of 
or even willing to put its policies into effect. On the other hand, social organisations are 
sometimes able to evade governmental control.
68 
Liberal conception can also be criticised for concentrating on formal independence from 
the government and neglecting the implications of different funding sources on 
operational autonomy. Wang Shaoguang defines operational autonomy as 
“organization’s freedom to formulate and pursue a self-determined agenda without 
undue external pressures, wherever the pressures come from.”
69 
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It is widely believed that charitable contributions from private citizens, foundations and 
corporations are so abundant that organisations do not need to rely on sponsors which 
could jeopardise their organisational autonomy. According to Wang, this common belief 
is without empirical foundation. He analysed data from Lester Salamon’s Non-profit 
Sector Project from 1995 and found out that private giving was not the primary source 
of funding in any of the 22 countries presented in the research.
70
 Based on same 
database, Jessica Teets states that 56% of the NGOs in Western Europe received their 
funding from the government or public sector. Corresponding figures for post-
communist countries in Eastern Europe and new democracies in Latin America were 
33% and 15% respectively.
71 
Although data based on Salamon’s research does not allow any conclusions about the 
implications of funding to organisations operational autonomy, it still shows that non-
governmental organisations might have firmer relationship with the state in Western 
liberal countries than is generally believed. 
Liberal conception of organisational autonomy might be even poorer indicator of 
autonomy in China. It would predict that grassroots organisations and other unregistered 
organisations enjoy more autonomy than registered organisations due to lacking 
necessary governmental supervisory unit. However, given the restrictive nature of the 
political and legal framework and the lack of political protection from governmental 
agencies, opposite is true, and the state actually intrudes genuinely non-governmental 
organisations' affairs more frequently or the social organisations restrict their operations 
voluntarily. Many popular organisations have also been gradually co-opted by the state. 
First, a governmental agency or organisation gives a helping hand or money to the 
social organisation and as the agency becomes more involved in SO’s affairs, the 
agency gradually takes over whole SO.72 
Operational autonomy allows us to make predictions more in line with the empirical 
evidence. Grassroots organisations remain small and their agenda consists of politically 
insensitive tasks or tasks which might not be interpreted as political. Contrary to the 
liberal conception, my hypothesis suggests that Chinese social organisations 
deliberately seek tighter connections with governmental organisations because doing so 
they gain more operational autonomy. 
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Even if civil society sector as a whole lacks organisational autonomy, it is still 
reasonable to think that certain types of organisations enjoy more operational autonomy 
than other. I claim that operational autonomy is fruitful a concept to explain the 
behaviour of the social organisations in China, and that operational autonomy is closely 
































CIVIL SOCIETY MODEL FOR CHINA 
 
In this chapter I will provide a summary of the existing literature on Chinese SOs. There 
has been little exchange of thoughts between western, mostly English language 
literature and Chinese language literature. Both traditions have taken rather different 
approach to study Chinese social organisations and they both have raised several points 
which are relevant for my thesis. I start with dominant Western approaches, the civil 
society model and the corporatist model. The institutional approach sketched by 
Christopher Nevitt73 takes account some relevant characters in Chinese society, but it is 
not comprehensive enough to provide model for Chinese civil society. The Consultative 
Authoritarianism model and the Mass Line model sketched by Jessica Teets74 and Taru 
Salmenkari75 respectively offers more comprehensive view to understand how state-
society relation work in China. A recent development in the topic has been made by Sun 
Taiyi76. I have labelled his approach as dynamic adaptation model as it pays attention to 
changing situations and mutual learning process where both sides adjust their behaviour 
to meet better their goals. Lastly, I will discuss two approaches sketched by Chinese 
scholars. 
 
Civil Society Model 
 
The literature in the West has mostly concentrated around two approaches of state-
society relation, namely the civil society model and the corporatist model. Most Western 
scholars favour the corporatist models over civil society models, but even those who 
favour corporatism admit that China does not fit into a purely corporatist model either. 
Therefore, they are taking certain elements of civil society aspect into account when 
describing this relationship. 
Naturally, there is no agreement on specific definition of civil society among scholars 
although most of them would agree that at least autonomy is an essential character of 
social organisations. This can be seen for example in one of the most influential 
definition of civil society which is found in Lester M. Salamon's and Helmut K. 
Anheier's article In search of the non-profit sector. I: The question of definitions. They 
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see five key factors as the most compelling in defining non-governmental organisations. 
First, NGOs have to be formal. That is, they have to be institutionalised to some extent. 
Second, organisations must be institutionally separate from the government.  This does 
not mean that the organisations must be financially independent from the government. 
They may in fact even receive significant support from the government, but the point 
here is that the organisations must be private institutions in their basic structure, that is, 
the staff or executive boards should not be seated with the government officials. Third, 
non-profit organisations must not return profits to their owners or directors. Non-profit 
organisations can generate profits, but they must be returned to the basic mission of that 
organisation. In other words, non-profit organisations do not exist primarily to generate 
profits and it is this feature which differentiates the non-profit sector from the private 
sector. Fourth, a non-profit organisation should be self-governing. The basic activities 
should be controlled by organisation and not by any outside entity. Fifth, non-profit 
organisations should involve a significant degree of voluntary participation. This does 
not mean that all income should come from voluntary contributions or that all the staff 
should be volunteers, but that at least some of the key functions should be arranged 
voluntarily.77   
Most of the proponents of the civil society approach would also agree that there is an 
inevitable connection between the civil society and transition to democracy. For 
example, Alagappa Muthiah claims that much of the (neo-Tocquevillean) literature view 
civil society as a supporting structure to democratize the state. Associational life in civil 
society is thought to provide the social infrastructure for liberal democracy, supply the 
means to limit, resist, and curb the excesses of the state and market etc.
78 
The idea of democratisation is connected to the idea that civil society is a political 
counterweight to the state power. For example, Jude Howell points out that civil society 
”[...]implicitly assumes an oppositional and conflictual relation with the state, 
neglecting the cooperative dimensions.” 
79 
The proponents of civil society model have correctly described the Chinese 
government’s declining capability to control society and its effect on diversity of the 
society. This development has inevitably created more space for autonomous and 
independent grassroots organisations, but these organisations rarely have willingness or 
                                                 
77 Salamon 1992, 135 
78 Alagappa 2004, 41 
79 Howell 1994, 107 
37/85 
 
ability to oppose state or propose democratisation. For example, when Christopher Earle 
Nevitt studied small and large-scale entrepreneur’s associations in Tianjin, he found out 
that the small-scale entrepreneurs association (SELA) whose members would benefit 
most from the democratisation process did not actively pursue such goals. Quite 
contrary, SELA was more interested in controlling the small entrepreneurs than pursuing 
their interest, especially their political interests.80  Same kind of observations have been 
made by other researchers. Ray Yep studied private economy organisations in Huantai 
rural community in Shandong province, and noticed that organisations did not struggle 
for a greater organisational autonomy confronting the government, but they were trying 
to make themselves useful ally in matters which concerned the government most.81  
Jude Howell claims that apart from some underground organisations, Chinese social 
organisations do not have any democratic agenda and they do not provide any forum for 
a critical public discussion about the political affairs.82 Generally, Chinese SOs enjoy 
only limited autonomy from the state. Many SOs are in fact mixed organisations in 
which society and state are intertwined. Hence, SOs in China seem to lack autonomy 
which is most widely considered as an essential feature of civil society.
83
  
Perhaps the most influential proponent of civil society approach, Gordon White, thinks 
that despite the problems of applying civil society approach to China it still has some 
analytical advantages. Even though Chinese SOs could not be considered as fully 
independent or voluntary organisations, they still enjoy certain amount of autonomy and 
voluntariness. White believes that along with the economic reforms and the separation 
of politics and society, a relative amount of such organisations is likely to increase and 
this trend nurtures the development of true voluntary and autonomous civil society.
84
 
However, the concept of civil society still presupposes a clear-cut distinction between 
the state and society and it emphasises the autonomy of civil society. According to 
Judith Howell, this leads to partial explanations and will neglect SOs’ mutual 
relationships with the state in favour of their autonomous, voluntary and spontaneous 
characteristics.
85
 It implicitly presupposes an antagonistic relation, ignoring the 
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cooperative dimensions or as many Chinese scholars have put it “positive interaction” 
between the state and society.
86 
According to Wang and Song, many proponents of the civil society approach have 
rejected the strict interpretation of the “civil society against the state”-paradigm and 
have developed new concepts such as “state-led civil society” and the “semi-civil 
society.” Drawback in this strategy is that theory has to deviate away from the basic 
tenets of the civil society theory. Another strategy would be to deny Chinese social 
organisations’ autonomy as a whole and claim that they will gradually acquire it through 
socio-political progress in the future.
87 
 
Corporatist and Mixed Models 
 
Characters of Chinese state-society relationship might lead one to think that corporatism 
is more suitable approach for analysing Chinese SOs.  Historically, this concept was 
derived from the political tradition of non-democratic countries and authoritarian 
regimes. Contrary to civil society approach, corporatist approach does not see 
organisations as the basis of democratic development but as instruments of state.
88
  
According to Philippe Schmitter's influential definition, corporatism is 
[a] system of interest presentation in which the constituent units are organised into a 
limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the 
state and granted deliberate representational monopoly within their respective 
categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and 
articulation of demands and supports.
89 
Institutional environment in China clearly aims to corporatist organisation of society. 
The registration and dual administration system are textbook examples of corporatist 
system but the question of whether corporatist model is applicable in China should be 
based on the characteristics of the Chinese SOs.  Like already noted, the spectrum of 
social organisations in China is varied ranging from rather independent grassroots 
organisations to party-controlled SOs. White claimed that SOs are best described as 
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forming an organisational continuum stretching from state-dominated extreme to a civil 
society extreme, some organisations being more autonomous and voluntary than others. 
Many proponents of the corporatist model acknowledge the diversity of organisational 
spectrum and have made some adjustments to the corporatist model. For example, 
Margaret Pearson claims that Chinese business organisations present a Janus-faced 
nature. They represent both the interests of the state and society.
90
 
Pearson thinks that traditional state corporatist model exemplified by Schmitter still 
accounts for the structure of the relations between SOs and state fairly well. However, it 
fails to take account of the unique characters of socialist countries, especially those 
arising from the economic reforms. It also fails to consider Chinese association’s 
historical dualist nature, that is, arrangement of the state-society relationship whereby 
elements of extensive state control and organisations’ autonomy exist simultaneously. 
This system Pearson calls socialistic corporatism which should be distinguished from 
the state corporatism defined by Schmitter.
91 
Ray Yep, who has studied business organisations in Huantai County in Shandong 
province, found out that there was no such political exchange between the state and 
constituencies of these organisations which is essential for corporatist model to work.  
In the corporatist model SOs work as mediators between the state and society. They 
gather information from society and use it to negotiate with the state.  Firstly, he found 
out that business organisations in Huantai County were designed primarily for top-down 
communication and encouragement of policy compliance. They were too dominated by 
the state to be able to represent and communicate the interest of their constituencies to 
the state. Secondly, an organisation engaging in corporatist relation with the state needs 
also strong internal cohesion. To be able to negotiate with the state, an organisation 
needs to achieve conformity among its constituency. Yep found out that managers 
resisted horizontal integration and the business organisations were not able to foster 
unity among them. These two reasons hinder the development of corporatist relation to 
the state. Thus, Yep concludes that here might be cases of corporatist relations in China, 
but it does not exist in essence.
92
 
Tony Saich has criticised corporatism from different direction. According to him, 
government may have strict control over trade and business organisations but generally 
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speaking it lacks capability to impose its will on SOs. Corporatist model also 
underestimates SOs ability to oppose government’s interference. Most importantly, 
corporatist models overlook the idea that SOs may derive benefits from cooperation 
with the government. He claims that organisations' relation to state is rather symbiotic 
than unidirectional and they often purposely subordinate themselves to the state. This 
allows them to negotiate their own niche with the state and allows them to have more 
impact on policy-making. Through cooperative strategy SOs are also able to pursue 
their constituencies’ collective interest and organisational objectives more successfully.
93 
Qiusha Ma has proposed that concepts of civil society and corporatism could be applied 
simultaneously. She argues that top-down organised SOs, for example trade 
organisations could be analysed using corporatist model. Bottom-up organised 
organisations, on the contrary, should be analysed using civil society model
94.  
More recent attempt of overcoming the state control’s contingency problem is the 
concept of graduated control proposed by Kang Xiaoguang and Han Heng. According to 
them, various social organisations differ in public goods they provide and in their 
capacity to challenge state power. Therefore, any authoritarian government that wants to 
maximise the benefits derived from the social organisations and at the same time 
maintain its monopoly of political power, needs to supervise and regulate various social 
organisations differently according to their capability to organise collective action and 
the nature of public goods they provide.
95 
Different kinds of organisations challenge the state authority with different intensity. 
Kang and Heng have divided five different strategies which they have exemplified with 
regard to five basic organisation types. Politically antagonistic organisations, trade 
organisations and spiritual organisation possess greatest capability to organise collective 
action. Antagonistic organisations are by their very nature a threat to political elite, but 
trade organisations and spiritual organisations are potential threats. Official SO’s and 
grassroots organisations have only weak capability to challenge government. With 
regard to the public goods, antagonistic groups do not offer any public goods that 
government would be interested in, therefore the strategy is to ban them and crack them 
down as soon as they are detected. Trade organisations play an important role between 
the state and society so government’s strategy is to co-opt them and turn them into 
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government-controlled organisations. Spiritual organisations potentially produce public 
goods, so the government’s strategy is to restrict their establishment and growth so that 
their capability to collective action is limited. Official SOs produce important public 
goods so government’s strategy is to encourage their establishment and development. 
Strategy towards grassroots organisations is one of non-interference. They potentially 
produce important public goods, but because of their lack of potential to threat 
government they can operate quite freely unless they turn to antagonistic organisations.
96 
According to Yiyi Lu, these attempts to overcome the contingency problem have some 
theoretical appeal, but in essence they are still some version of corporatism-civil society 
continuum. Basic problem with these aspects is that they ignore the fact that in China 
the boundary between state and society is often vague. Consequently, scholars in this 
state-society paradigm treat SOs autonomy as degree of formal independence from the 
state, even while realising that the most SOs are in fact mixture of state and society.
97 
It seems that state-society paradigm models face insuperable problems. First, the 
associational complexity results in creative application of theories which stretches the 
boundaries of theoretical consistency. Hence, scholars have revised existing theories and 




, or “system of graduated control.”
100
 Second, state-society paradigm 
models overlook essential features in Chinese associational life. In the next chapters I 




Christopher Nevitt has suggested a different point of view. He uses in his studies an 
institutional focus by which he means ”a focus on changing incentives and behaviour 
within the institutions of the party-state”
101
 He compared two major private business 
organisations in Tianjin. One of these was Self-Employed Labourers' Association 
(SELA)Geti laodongzhe xiehui, which consisted of small entrepreneurs. The other one 
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was the Industrial and Commercial Federation (ICF) Gongshangye lianhehui, which 
consisted of big private and public enterprises.
102
 Quite contrary to his assumption, ICF 
was far more active in pursuing its member’s interests than SELA. Nevitt argues that the 
reason for such a stark contrast in their behaviour was not due to deliberate party-state 
policy, but different incentives guiding the careers of party-state officials who controlled 
these organisations at different levels.
103 
Nevitt distinguished two different career strategies for the officials. The traditional 
”ladder of advancement” strategy means that officials are trying to fulfil their tasks and 
the expectations of their superiors as well as possible in order to get promotion. After 
the market reforms and economic decentralisation, ”Big-fish-in-a-small-pond” strategy 
became a more attractive option. Officials pursuing this strategy are more interested in 
developing their own local networks than pleasing their superiors and they actively try 
to isolate themselves from the officials above them. Thus, they are favouring policies 
and actions which are in the best interest of their local political constituencies.
104 
According to Nevitt, this explains the difference between the behaviour of SELA and 
ICF. Municipal-level officials are under direct scrutiny from the central government and 
they have already invested a great deal in their careers. In consequence, they are much 
more likely to trust in the ladder of advancement strategy than district level officials. 
District level officials on the contrary, have invested less in their careers and they are 
not under direct supervision of central government. They have strategic advantage on 
creating personal networks and increasing their power at the expense of the municipal 
level officials, hence they are more likely pursue ”big-fish-in-a-small-pond” strategy.
105 
For district level officials, small entrepreneurs of SELA are a poor investment for 
political capital. In consequence, SELA chapters merely concentrate on controlling their 
members and avoid wasting district government’s resources by pursuing their interests. 
On the other hand, big private enterprises of the ICF serve as engines of the economy 
and thus, promoting their rapid growth is an effective investment on political capital of 
the district officials. On municipal level, officials are not so much interested in gaining 
their institutional power as they are pleasing their superiors in Beijing. On municipal 
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level SELA and ICF acted quite similarly and both tried to balance their control and 
advocacy functions in a way that it did not generate friction with their superiors.
106 
Jonathan Unger has studied business organisations in Beijing and he has come to same 
kind of conclusion. He found out that SELA and Private Enterprises Association (PEA) 
were dominated by their supervising government agency to that extent that they were 
not able to present the interests of their constituencies. On the contrary, ICF was 
extremely successful in presenting their member’s interests to the central and local 
governments even beyond the goals of the state.
107 
Anthony Spires has conceptualised this institutional setting differently. He has studied 
grassroots organisations and found same kind of tendencies as Nevitt and Unger in 
private business organisations. Because government officials’ survival and career 
progress in China is determined largely by how their superiors judge their performance, 
especially officials at lower level strive for political credit zhengji (政绩) in order to be 
judged favourable. Political credit can be understood as political equivalent of the 
concept of “face” mianzi (面子). “Face” is prestige or social standing and it can be 
granted or lost.  According to Spires, organisation which is able to grant political credit 
to government official is more likely to get support from him or her and can lead to 
symbiotic relation with the government official with mutual benefits. Conversely, if 
SO’s activity is apt to reveal policy failures or otherwise make government officials lose 
political face in the eyes of their superiors. This relation he calls contingent symbiosis 
as it is based on practical considerations on each side. Symbiotic relation emerges only 
when both sides have something to gain. Thus, in order to survive, SO leaders must 
minimise conflicts with government agents and maximise the political credit given to 
them.
108
 This symbiotic relation gives SOs space for manoeuvring and is important 
institutional factor when SOs, in Tony Saich’s words, negotiate their own niche with the 
state. According to Saich, it is rational for the SOs to engage in symbiotic relationship 
with the state because then they can influence officials to their own advantage.
109
  
According to Lu Yiyi, institutional analysis gives us more subtle understanding of the 
Chinese SOs. It pays attention to different actors within the state and society and to the 
incentives, opportunities and constraints that shape their behaviour. Moreover, it reveals 
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another deeply-rooted habit of thinking in the state-society paradigm. Scholars have 
considered the autonomy from the state as the most important attribute of the SOs. 
Many classifications of the SOs have been made on the basis of their relative autonomy, 
for example by dividing them into government organised NGOs (GONGO) and genuine 
NGOs. This suggests that researchers have considered relative autonomy to be a 
significant clue to SOs’ behaviour. However, Lu argues that relative autonomy is a poor 
indicator of SOs behaviour. An officially organised SO may in fact enjoy more actual 
autonomy than popular organisation and classifying Chinese organisations according to 
their relative autonomy from the state can actually conceal some essential features in 
their relationships with the state and their constituencies. For example, the previously 
mentioned ICF enjoyed more autonomy than SELA, although its tighter connections to 
the government would suggest otherwise.
110 
 
Consultative Authoritarianism Model 
 
Consultative authoritarianism describes a type of authoritarian regime which uses 
formal communication channels to get information from its citizens’ preferences and 
opinions. According to He and Warren, authoritarianism can be divided in three 
different style according to their communication. Command authoritarianism uses 
instrumental communication. Its purpose is to deliver preferences of those in power to 
citizens without regard to what preferences citizens have. Deliberative authoritarianism 
instead, encourages citizens to express their ideas. Communication is seen as a means to 
mutual change of ideas. Consultative authoritarianism is a mix of the two. Its 
communication is strategic. Main purpose of communication is to express decision-
makers own preferences, but they take preferences of the citizens into account to 
achieve their own goals.
111 
Jessica Teets has developed the idea of consultative authoritarianism to state-civil 
society relations. According to her, under the consultative authoritarianism, state is able 
to take advantage of more autonomous and pluralistic civil society, while still 
maintaining control over it by creating more sophisticated means of control.
112  
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Authoritarian states are unable to get reliable information of citizen’s grievances 
through their formal institutions. Teets claims that officials in China have learned 
through experience and observing other authoritarian states that autonomous civil 
society can help also authoritarian states to improve their governance. Moreover, 
changes in political economy in China have opened opportunities for SOs to cooperate 
with government agencies. Through decentralisation process, central government has 
devolved responsibility of provision of public goods to local governments. At the same 
time central government has kept monopoly on fiscal policy. Local governments’ ability 
to collect taxes and raise loans are restricted. Growing demands on performance and 
low funding has led local governments to run budget deficits and collect illegal taxes or 
fees. Moreover, cadre performance is evaluated by economic targets such as provision 
of public goods and this affects how local officials are promoted. According to Teets, 
local governments have learned that social organisations besides having close contacts 
to society are also a source of funding and novel policies from abroad. Thus, social 
organisations are able to help local governments to fulfil their targets.
113 
According to Teets, there are several differences in CA model compared to corporatist 
models. First, unlike corporatism, CA model allows multiple organisations to compete 
in the same area or jurisdiction. In corporatism state has given monopoly of 
representation to one organisation for an entire constituency, usually to an organisation 
founded by the state itself. Thus, CA model is more open to different kinds of 
standpoints and opinions.
114 
Second, CA model allows SOs considerable autonomy. They are able to hire their own 
staff, they have independent resources and goals. 
Third, CA model utilises more adaptable means of control. Unlike corporatism, which 
uses direct means of control, CA model uses more sophisticated means.
115
 In previous 
chapter I introduced the concept of graduated control in which government agencies 
utilise different kind of instruments to control different kind of organisations
116
. Those 
which are regarded as safe or beneficial are treated differently from those which are 
regarded as harmful. It is also noticeable that different state agencies may have different 
standpoint to the same organisation. For example, a certain environmental SO may be 
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deemed harmful by local authorities, but a central government agency can see it as a 
useful tool for implementing national environmental laws.
117    
Fourth, CA model uses also positive incentives to control organisations. Organisations 
which have close ties to government have access to the policy-making process. Other 
positive incentives are governmental funding, capacity-building programs and pilot 
project permits.
118  
Consultative authoritarianism defined by Teets comes very close to Anthony Spires’s 
concept of contingent symbiosis. The essential feature in both is mutual benefit. 
Government officials will gain resources which they can turn into political credit while 
SOs will gain resources and as I shall argue, legitimacy is the most important of the 
resources, because it will give SOs protection and opportunity to develop their 
operational autonomy. The CA model is also compatible with the graduated control 
approach. Officials who are engaging in cooperation with SOs have to consider their 
advantages and disadvantages the way described by the graduated control approach. 
 
Mass Line Model 
 
Taru Salmekari claims that, if we are to find a unified Chinese civil society model, we 
have to look in the state itself. She proposes a civil society model which derives from 
the Communist ideology itself. The Maoist mass line model is a model of political 
communication between the Communist Party and the people. According to the mass 
line model, ordinary people provide the grassroots information of their needs and 
interests, which government then organises into intelligible form and uses for drafting 
new policies. This vertical consultation system was designed to provide reliable and 
comprehensive information for the policymaking.
119
 
It must be noted that originally mass line concept was designed to be link between rigid 
party system and the masses. Party has bureaucratic tendencies and it would alienate 
itself quickly from the ordinary people’s troubles and grievances unless there is a 
system of mutual communication. Moreover, the traditional concept regards masses as 
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individuals120. The present mass line model is revised version of the original concept 
where individuals are seen also as members of organisations. 
According to Salmenkari, the mass line model encourages SOs to engage in vertical 
relations to government officials, while discouraging horizontal relations between other 
SOs. Moreover, it does so especially by promoting personal relations between 
governmental officials and private citizens. Thus, the essential features of the model are 
tight vertical relations and vague boundary between the state and society. This kind of 
arrangement definitely fosters corporatist or co-opted mode of relations between the 
state and society jeopardizing the organisational autonomy. On the other hand, this 
model gives ordinary people and SOs an opportunity to influence state policies through 
providing state agencies information. In other words, mass line model fosters the 
deliberative functions of the society.
121
 As Jude Howell and Ronald C. Keith respectively 
have shown in their studies, Chinese SOs can raise critical issues in public debate even 
in some sensitive areas, such as human rights, but horizontal cooperation such as 
collective action is discouraged.
122 
Mass line model and consultative authoritarianism model share some essential features. 
Both concentrate on the relations of the state officials and SOs especially the mutual 
flow of information and resources and rejected the idea of autonomy as degree of 
independence from the state. Hence, both models are able to escape the duality problem 
characteristic of the state-society paradigm. Both models can also explain how 
autonomous SOs can survive and develop in China. However, consultative 
authoritarianism model is more general, it can be applied to different authoritarian 
systems in different countries. It gives explanation how interaction between officials 
and SOs actually work from the point of view of an outside observer. The mass line 
model, on the other hand, puts the phenomenon in its historical context. It provides 
normative rationale for SOs behaviour from the point of view of those inside the 
system. In other words, the CA model obtains an etic point of view and the mass line 
model an emic point of view. Ideally, a good research should combine both of these 
viewpoints. 
 According to Teets, the rationale behind collaboration for government officials is 
strategic. Changing political economy and promotion criteria has led them to 
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collaborate with SOs. Unfortunately, this view is too limited. It explains why local 
authorities collaborate with SOs, but it overlooks the multitude of other reasons behind 
collaboration. For example, some environmental SOs act directly against the interests of 
local authorities and collaborate with central government agencies. It also fails to take 
into account SOs active role in pursuing larger autonomy and government agencies’ 
tendency to co-opt SOs. Many SOs actively search foreign and domestic private 
resources to achieve stronger negotiation leverage and gain autonomy. Teets, also 
claimed that consultative authoritarianism can be used to describe most of the SOs but 
not organisations which are operating in the corporatist system. The advantage of the 
mass line model is that it can explain the different government attitudes toward various 
organisational forms with single model. It can explain traditional corporatist 




Dynamic adaptation model 
 
An interesting recent development of the state-society relationship model is made by 
Taiyi Sun. I call his approach as dynamic adaptation model as it emphasises 
government’s and SO’s interactive learning process where both sides adjust their 
behaviour in changing situations to achieve their goals better. Sun studied SOs after 
major earthquakes in Wenchuan (2008) and Lushan (2013) to see how exogenous 
shocks affected to state-society relations. His model does not provide normative 
grounds for the state-society relations, but it gives an interesting viewpoint how this 
relation can evolve and especially how SOs’ possibility to develop autonomy can 
change over time. Sun’s model focuses on two variables which determine the nature of 
relationship between government and SOs: government effectiveness in providing 
public services and the alignment of the SOs’ goals with those of government. Based on 
these variables he has provided four types of government-SO relation: competition, 
complementarity, confrontation and cooperation.124 
When the government is effective and the SO’s goal aligns with the government’s goal, 
relation is competitive. Competitive relations tend to be short-lived since the 
government must strive for similar resources and the SO might distract public attention 
from official’s good work. According to Sun, government tries to turn competitive 
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relations gradually into co-optation, and if it does not work, eventually close down the 
SO.125 
When government is effective but the SO’s goal is divergent, the relation tends to be 
confrontational. Again, the government must compete for similar resources but this time 
the SO acts directly against government’s goal. For example, when an environmental 
SO exposes pollution crime and the local government wants to conceal it or when 
religious organisation offers public services, but at the same time promotes ideology 
which is contrary to the state ideology. In these cases, the government usually tries to 
dissolve the SO as soon as it comes aware of it.126 
In case of ineffectiveness of the government, the possible outcomes are more complex. 
When a SO’s goal aligns with the government’s goal relationship is complementary. The 
government benefits from the resources and expertise of the SO and can better achieve 
its targets. In the long run, these relationships are quite stable unless the government 
feels its status in the eyes of public or superiors is threatened by the SO’s good work. If 
so, the relationship will turn to confrontational and the government will try to get rid of 
the SO. Otherwise, the relationship can continue as complementary or cooperative 
depending whether the SO provides resources which government lacks altogether such 
as expertise or just basic resources which government is only short of. According to 
Sun, under complimentary and cooperative relationship, the government usually allows 
SOs to operate quite freely and gain some autonomy.127 
If the SO’s goals are not aligned with the government’s goals, the relationship can 
initially be cooperative. According to Sun, this is possible if government is incapable of 
providing some public services, which is the case usually after big disasters such as 
earthquakes. For example, after Wenchuan earthquake some governments allowed 
religious organisations to help in disaster relief. Obviously, this kind of relationship is 
not very stable, and the government will dissolve the SO as soon as it is possible.128 
The latter case is also the case where SOs adjustment of their behaviour became most 
visible. According to Sun’s studies some SOs realigned their goals with the government 
goals hoping to transform the unstable cooperative relation to a complementary one. 
Especially religious organisations were successful in this transformation. However, 
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according to same study, it was impossible to revive their original mission once they 
had established complementary relation with the government.129 
In Sun’s study, those SOs which were engaged in competitive relation tended to shift 
into co-optive relation. For many SOs in China, getting resources is continuous and 
severe problem. Since competition and maintaining good relations to government 
requires resources and if SO is not able to attract private donations, it might be rational 
for them to trade off their autonomy for more stable funding and switch from 
competition to co-optation. After co-optation, the government pays usually SO’s salaries 
and other expenses, and consequently there is no need to put so much resources in 
maintaining good relations to the government anymore. However, from the point of 
view of civil society, it is bad thing and other SOs see it as betrayal.130 
Not only civil society is learning and adjusting in this process. Local governments can 
learn from the SOs and increase the efficiency of their service provision. Thus, the long 
run, there is tendency to shift towards efficient government scenarios and co-optive 
relationships.131  
Thus, when government is effective in providing services the relations with the SOs 
tend to end up in co-optation or dissolution. When government is ineffective in 
providing services, the relation with the SO can evolve into cooperative or more stable 
complimentary one. 
Sun Taiyi’s model is good at explaining the dynamics between the state and civil 
society in localities but it does not take into account the fragmentary nature of Chinese 
governance. It treats government-SO relations as one-on-one relation when usually this 
relationship is affected also by government-government relations. For example, many 
environmental SOs take advantage of their relations to other governments. Thus, they 
are able to maintain the confrontational relationship with local authorities by allying 
with Ministries or other Central Government organisations. However, Dynamic 
adaptation model shows that for any SO willing to ally with the government in mass 
line style relation and perhaps maintain its autonomy requires that the SO is at least a 
partial solution to the governments inefficiency problem. That is, it helps the 
government to achieve its targets more effectively. 
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The Dual Role of Chinese Social Organisations 
 
An important addition to my analytical framework is brought by Chinese scholars who 
have introduced concepts of “post-totalist society” and “the dual nature of Chinese 
social organisations”. By totalist society they refer to society before the reform and 
opening-up policy started in 1978. According to Sun Liping, in totalist society, the state 
controls most of the resources and economic and social interactions. In the post totalist 
society, state has given up the control over important resources and allows people more 
freely to associate in social and economic spheres. Therefore, the post totalist society is 
characterised by ”free-floating resources” and ”free operating space”. However, the 
state in post-totalist society is not totally powerless. It is still able to exert heavy 
influence on economy and social life, although it does so in irregular and informal 
ways.
132 
Post totalist society creates possibilities for social organisations but it also determines 
pattern of their behaviour. According to Sun Liping, to survive and to be successful, 
Chinese NGOs must be able to exploit resources both ”within the system” and ”outside 
the system.” They cannot ignore either of them. If a top-down organisation like the 
China Youth Development Organisation with its strong connections to the system 
insulates itself from the system, it would fail to use its political advantage and 
consequently it would be very difficult for it to mobilise social resources for its use. On 
the other hand, top-down organisation cannot rely solely on resources acquired from the 
system, because if an organisation wants to mobilise social resources outside state 
control, it can do it on its own. This is what the Chinese scholars refer to with the 
concept of dual nature of the Chinese SOs.
133 
In the next chapter I elaborate with one case study example how the China Youth 
Development Foundation was able to gain operational autonomy through administrative 
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A Case study: The China Youth Development Foundation and 
the Project Hope 
 
The China Youth Development Foundation (CDYF) is generally considered as an 
officially organised top-down organisation which is outside of my focus, but it 
nevertheless reveals some essential means to achieve autonomy which are relevant also 
for other social organisations’ development and survival. 
The CYDF was originally founded in 1989 and registered under supervision of the 
Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL). It was founded by Xu Yongguang, himself a 
former high-ranking cadre in the CYL. The Project Hope was initiated due to a fact that 
government had not succeed in providing all the children nine years of mandatory and 
free education. Some two million children, mostly in rural areas, were too poor to attend 
school. Moreover, there were two hundred million illiterates at that time in China. The 
Project Hope was CYDF’s first project and its aim was to help these disadvantaged 
children to return to school and complete at least elementary education.
134
 The Project 
Hope grew rapidly into one of the largest and most successful public service projects in 
China. According to the founder Xu Yongguang, it has raised in past 25 years (2015) 
almost US$ 2 billion from the public, provided scholarships for more than 5 million 
poor students and built 18000 schools
135.  
One could think that an officially organised organisation would be mere tool in the 
hands of supervisory organisation, but the CDYF has enjoyed a remarkable degree of 
operational autonomy. It has been able successfully to push the limits and even 
circumvent some national regulations. At the same time, it has been able to avoid 
political consequences. One example of this is the launch of the Project Hope in 
November 1989 on the eve of 40th anniversary of the founding of People’s Republic of 
China. Earlier that year China had gone through the most severe political turmoil of the 
reform era. The Party had appealed to media to concentrate on the brighter side of the 
country and its history and obviously exposing poverty and policy failures would not 
have been what the Party was asking for. Should CYDF have asked permission to 
organise press conference to launch the program from CYL it would most likely have 
been denied and the entire project would have been jeopardised. Instead, CYDF decided 
                                                 





first to send half million copies of letter of appeal to companies all over the country 
asking them to donate money for the project. Rationale behind this was to cause trouble 
first and then see how the supervisory organisation would react. Fortunately, the 
supervisory organisation did not do anything, and the permission to organise the press 
conference was successfully applied later.136   
The CYDF’s fund raising techniques actually caused much worries in other segments of 
the administration. Especially the Ministry of Education was embarrassed by the 
publication of educational deprivation of poor children in the countryside which starkly 
contradicted their own statistics which always emphasised their success in school 
attendance. Party’s Propaganda Department was also worried that such information 
would not only damage the Ministry of Education but would also be harmful to entire 
government and they actually put some pressure on the CYL. The CYL never gave in to 
the pressure and continued to support the CYDF and the Project Hope. Undoubtedly, the 
CYDF could not have resisted pressure from such powerful state organisations if it 
would have not been under the umbrella of the CYL protection.
137 
Another example is when the CDYF was spreading its operations to provinces. Multi-
level management system requires that social organisations should be confined to the 
administrative level they are registered at and national level organisations are not 
allowed to set up local branches in provinces. The CYDF nevertheless kept establishing 
local offices calling them “funds”. According to the CYDF, a fund is just a sum of 
money for a certain purpose, not an organisation or foundation and thus setting up local 
funds in provinces would not breach regulations.
138 
The CYDF proved to be also immune against co-optation and taking over of the Project 
Hope by the CYL or its local branches. According to Lu’s studies, the CYL Central 
Committee did not have great passion to supervise, let alone co-opt the CYDF or its 
project. In time of registration, the CYL Central Committee appointed only one person 
to supervisory office which was set up to monitor the finances of the organisation and 
even that one was chosen by the CYDF itself. Moreover, all the expenses of supervisory 
office, including salaries and welfare benefits of the workers, were paid by the CYDF 
not the CYL. It is clear that the CYL Central Committee had a strong trust in the CYDF 
and their operations. However, the CYDF relied totally on the CYL’s nationwide 
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network in their implementing the Project Hope in the provinces. CYL local branches 
soon started to use the name of Project Hope for their own purposes challenging the 
ownership of the Project Hope. To counter this, the CYDF founded independent offices 
to manage Project Hope funds in every province. These offices were still under the aegis 
of provincial branches of the CYL but they all had independent legal status. The CYDF 
managed to gain some control over them on the basis of its ownership of Project Hope. 
Again, this manoeuvre which limited CYL local branches’ control of the project would 
not have been successful without support and backing of the CYL Central Committee 
on the matter.
139 
As this case demonstrates, the CYDF is not a passive recipient of the orders from its 
professional supervisory unit but rather an autonomous organisation capable of defining 
and carrying out their own vision. Why the CYDF then was so successful in gaining 
autonomy although their operations created distractions between the CYL and other 
state organs and also between the CYL Central Committee and local branches of the 
CYL? The obvious answer is that the CYDF had very strong inherent administrative 
legitimacy due to the fact that its founder was respected and trusted ex-cadre of the 
CYL. The second reason is that the CYDF quickly gained financial independence. In 
the beginning the CYDF was financially dependent on the CYL. The CYL paid its 
registration fee and initial operational costs but soon the Project Hope’s success made 
the CYDF independent. Financial independence gives organisation leverage to negotiate 
greater autonomy. The CYDF not only gained financial independence but also cleverly 
started to fund activities and projects organised by the CYL, turning the financial 
dependence upside down. Most importantly the CYDF and especially the Project Hope 
rendered CYL leaders with political prestige. The CYDF maintained low profile with 
the project and let CYL leaders to take credit for its success. According to couple of 
studies mentioned by Lu, CYL leaders associated with the Project Hope have actually 
been successful in their career advancement later in their careers.
140   
Thus, the CYDF effectively used both governmental and private resources to negotiate 
its operating space. At the beginning, it relied entirely on governmental resources but 
soon after it had established the project, it converted its strong social legitimacy into 
public donations and financial independence which, in turn, was used to negotiate 
greater autonomy. However, I will argue later that governmental resources are more 
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important in the sense that it is not possible for organisations to acquire the full potential 
of private resources if it has not already recognised by government and gained 
administrative legitimacy.  
From the institutional point of view, giving the CYDF more autonomy was rational 
thing to do for CYL cadres. By Nevitt’s concepts, CYL cadres were pursuing ladder of 
advancement strategy
141
. The CYDF and the Project Hope created only bearable 
frictions between the CYL and other state organs. It was practically free and it brought 
benefits, especially political prestige for CYL cadres which were later promoted to 
higher positions. Moreover, the CYDF dealt carefully with publicity and did not 
criticize the government for shortcomings but instead fanfared how the Party-state 


















                                                 
141 Nevitt 1996, 41 
56/85 
 
METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
The empirical part of my thesis aims to support my hypothesis that Chinese social 
organisations’ operational autonomy is dependent on government official recognition. 
This recognition is conceptualised as administrative legitimacy. I will demonstrate that 
SOs’ operational autonomy positively correlates with administrative legitimacy. I will 
also demonstrate that operational autonomy positively correlates with financial 
independence which suggests that Chinese SOs need also donations from private sector 
to gain operational autonomy. Lastly, I will demonstrate that financial independence 




My initial survey consisted of one interview in Beijing and one group interview in 
Chengdu. I also worked in an environmental SO in Shanghai for three months.  Based 
on the information obtained in these interviews and fieldwork, I sketched the final 
version of my questionnaire. The first eight questionnaires I sent to organisations which 
were introduced to me by personal contacts and all of them completed and returned the 
questionnaire. Next round of questionnaires I sent to 20 organisations without a third 
person introduction but none of them completed the questionnaire. So, the final 
response rate was 28.5%. However, I was able to gather necessary information of 
several organisations through China Development Brief’s NGO directory and 
organisations’ web pages. Thus, altogether my sample consists of 17 organisations. Nine 
of them were located in Beijing, and the remaining 8 in provincial capitals including, 
Shanghai, Chengdu, Hangzhou, Kunming, Chongqing, Suzhou, and Changsha. Thus, 
my sample covers fairly extensive spectrum of different provinces from capital city and 
rich eastern provinces to less developed western provinces. 
Low response rate was anticipated. Many researchers have reported difficulties in doing 
this kind of survey in China. For example, Zhan and Tang reported that many social 
organisations declined to complete their survey. They suggested that lack of time and 
political risks were possible reason for unwillingness to answer.142 Even though the 
information I collected in my questionnaire was mostly publicly available, the topic in 
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itself might be understood as political and respondents declined to answer to a 
previously unknown person. It is also possible that many SO workers were busy 
working and had no time to respond to my questionnaire. However, I used an online 
analysis and survey tool to collect information and thus I was able to see that many 
organisations had opened my questionnaire, some of them even three times, and still 
declined to answer. Thus, for future studies, more stress on creating connections to 
organisations’ personnel is essential. 
I used semi-structured questionnaire to collect data about the nature of the 
organisations’ operations and the resources available to them (see appendix I). 
Questions included the registration status of the organisation, organisational activities 
and resources including their relations to other sectors of society, especially to the 
government offices. The questionnaire was translated into Chinese so that the questions 
would have been understood in the same way by the respondents.   
 
Methodology and Hypothesis 
 
Because political connections especially to the Central Government officials and private 
donations were supposed to be important for obtaining operational autonomy, I expected 
that economic prosperity in the SO’s location and distance from the political centre both 
have significant influence on SOs’ ability to develop their activities. Thus, I first 
identified three distinct target areas where I would conduct my survey. 1) Beijing as a 
capital city and political centre has traditionally offered viable ground for social 
organisations. 2) Yangtze and Pearl River delta areas as economically developed regions 
but further away from the political centre. 3) Less developed and politically distant 
provinces in inland. However, when analysing the data, I realised that in most cases for 
the sake of my argument it is necessary to divide my data only to two target areas, 
namely Beijing and rest of the country. Economic prosperity of the location did not have 
considerable effect on SOs legitimacy or autonomy. 
My main hypothesis is that social organisations in China obtain autonomy by 
participating in mass line style of relation with the governmental organisations. Through 
participation they will gain administrative legitimacy which gives them protection, and 
legitimacy in the eyes of the society which makes them more attractive for private 
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donors. With governmental and private resources together, SOs are able to achieve 
operational autonomy which I call dependent autonomy. 
I will test my hypothesis with three kinds of relation. First, I will compare 
administrative legitimacy with operational autonomy. If this correlation is positive it 
will support my hypothesis. Any instance which presents low administrative legitimacy 
and strong operational autonomy would outright refute my hypothesis. Second, I will 
compare financial independence and operational autonomy. Again, positive correlation 
will support my thesis. Any instance which presents strong operational autonomy and 
low financial independence would pose an anomaly needing explanation. Third, I will 
compare administrative legitimacy with financial independence. If this correlation is 
positive it will support my hypothesis and prove my hypothesis that private donations 
are dependent on governmental recognition and administrative legitimacy of social 
organisation. 
 
Operationalisation of Concepts 
 
In this chapter I will operationalise the basic concepts I am using when testing my 
hypothesis. Two of them, namely, administrative legitimacy and operational autonomy 
have already been defined in previous chapters. However, it is not yet clear how these 
concepts should be understood in terms of empirical observations. The phenomena 
behind these concepts are diverse and they are not easily grasped by specific concepts. 
My operational concepts are not trying to be extensive ones grasping the totality of the 
phenomenon, but rather for the sake of simplicity and measurability I have provided one 
or two criteria for each concept which determine both sufficient and necessary criteria 
for the phenomena. The third concept, financial independence, is a rather simple 
concept which does not need further theoretical clarification. Thus, I will provide only 




As noted earlier, by operational autonomy I mean organisations ability to independently 
set up its own agenda and to operate according to it regardless of opposition. Then 
problem rises how we know when organisations are able to set up their own agenda and 
how we are able to measure the operational autonomy. I claim that different activities 
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represent different levels of operational autonomy. Larry Diamond has identified six 
different types of activities that citizen are collectively engaged in public sphere 1)“to 
express their interest, passions, and ideas”; 2) “to exchange information”;3) “to achieve 
collective goals”; 4) “to make demands on the state”; 5) “to improve the structure and 
the functioning of the state”; 6) “to hold state officials accountable.”
143 
Diamond uses this classification to argue that organisations engaging in activities at the 
end of the list are contributing more to the development of civil society and 
democratisation than organisations at the beginning of the list.
144
 As noted earlier 
Chinese social organisations generally do not have ability or willingness to contribute to 
democratisation process. However, I want to extend the application of Diamond’s 
classification to the concept of operational autonomy. Thus, organisations engaging 
activities further down the list are representing more operational autonomy than 
organisations engaging activities in the beginning of the list. Activities from 1 to 3 are 
considered relatively nonautonomous and nonpolitical. They are usually in line with the 
government policy or can even be outsourced government tasks. Activities from 4 to 6 
represent strong operational autonomy. These activities contain intensive and sometimes 
even confrontational interaction with the government officials and are more likely to 
raise opposition in some government organisations or officials and are also interpreted 
more political in nature.
145  
In my research, certain activity represents low, medium or high degree of operational 
autonomy. For example, environmental education represents only a weak operational 
autonomy. It is aligned with government’s agenda and can be seen only as a tool of 
implementing its interests. Same goes with community service and development 
projects. Environmental policy advocacy, however, is by nature political and it involves 
changing cadres’ views, government policies and laws. Policy advocacy can of course 
represent different levels of operational autonomy. Some organisations may avoid direct 
conflicts with governments and some organisations may advocate more sensitive 
policies. Policy advocacy intended to change village cadres’ opinions is also considered 
less autonomous than advocating policies at provincial or national level. Exposure of 
illegal activities and legal assistance to pollution victims even to the extent that some 
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officials are held accountable are considered as extreme modes of policy advocacy 
representing strong operational autonomy. 
 
Administrative Legitimacy  
 
Administrative legitimacy derives from government agencies’ or officials’ recognition 
or support of the organisation or its activities. The dual supervision system requires 
registered social organisations to have governmental organisation as its supervisory unit. 
Finding a supervisory unit is itself a difficult task and requires good connections to the 
government. Thus, the registration status itself is an important indication of 
administrative legitimacy. Organisation registered as social organisations with the MCA 
and organisations affiliated with government organisations enjoy strong administrative 
legitimacy due to their close connection to their supervisory unit. Organisations 
registered as private non-enterprise units with MCA enjoy medium administrative 
legitimacy and non-profit enterprises weak administrative legitimacy. Governmental 
recognition and support can be verified also by informal connections to the state organs. 
Cooperation and financial support can also be important indication of the governmental 
recognition. As a rule of thumb, the higher the governmental organisation is, stronger 
the administrative legitimacy it gives. For example, cooperation with central 
government organisations such as the Ministry of Environmental Protection or the State 
Forestry Administration gives strong administrative legitimacy. Cooperation with 
provincial government gives medium administrative legitimacy and cooperation with 
lesser state organs at provincial level organisations such as Environmental Protection 
Bureaus gives weak administrative legitimacy. If organisation is not registered and it 
lacks any connections to state organisations it has negligible administrative legitimacy. 
Organisations which have been registered as national level social organisations and have 
connections to central government organisations would have very strong administrative 
legitimacy. Thus, organisations can have weak, medium or strong administrative 




Organisation’s financial independence is determined by the size of its budget and 
diversity of its financial supporters. Organisations with budget over one million RMB 
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and multiple international and national funding sources have high financial 
independence. Organisations with budgets under 100000 RMB and single funding 
source have negligible financial independence. Thus, organisation can have high, 
medium, low or negligible financial independence according to their financial budget 































This section consists of two chapters. In the first one I will present the data which I 
collected from the questionnaire responses and different internet sources. This data will 
provide general background of political, legal and financial situation of the 
organisations in my sample. In the second part I will test my findings with correlation 
analysis of specific variables, namely administrative legitimacy, operational autonomy 




This chapter clarifies the factors behind the concepts I am using in my correlation 
analysis. Registration status and relations to the government determines the 
administrative legitimacy. Organisational budgets and sources of funding determines 
the financial independence and organisational activities how much operational 




Chinese government uses registration as a tool to control the growth of the social 
organisations and their activities. Registration status does not only determine 
organisations legal status but also its ability to develop its activities and to raise funds. 
The most favourable status is officially registered social association which is granted a 
tax exemption. However, there can be only one social organisation in each level of a 
jurisdiction at the time. Most of the organisations must register as social service 
organisations, non-profit enterprises with the Bureau of Industry and Commerce, or 
continue without registration. 
There were three organisations registered as a social association with the MCA in my 
sample. All of them were located in provincial capitals in western provinces. The most 
common registration status was social service organisation (SSO) registered with the 
MCA. More than half of the organisations were registered as SSOs. It was somewhat 
more common in Beijing as in provinces. In Beijing 66.7% of the organisations were 
registered as SSOs compared to 37.5% in provinces. Three organisations were 
registered as non-profit enterprises (NPE) with the Bureau of Industry and Commerce. 
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One organisation was not registered at all, and one organisation was affiliated with 
university and thus exempted from registration. Both of the last-mentioned 
organisations were located in Beijing, 
 




Most of the organisations’ activities were directly related to environmental protection. 
Two organisations provided legal help for pollution victims and one organisation was 
engaged in scientific analysis of environmental and energy source policies. Other 
activities ranged from environmental education to policy advocacy. Environmental 
education, spreading environmental awareness and community development were the 
most popular activities; five organisations were engaged in each of them.  Two 
organisations were involved with scientific research and community services. One 
organisation monitored environmental pollution and reported violations of 





Figure 3) Organisational activities 
In my sample, organisations in Beijing had different focus on activities than those in the 
provinces. Provincial organisations were more engaged in environmental education and 
developmental projects. Activities, which presented strong operational autonomy, such 
as environmental policy advocacy, and legal assistance of pollution victims were 
practically absent. Only one organisation in the provinces reported environmental policy 
advocacy as their primary activity. On the other hand, environmental monitoring and 
reporting of illegal pollution was more common in the provinces than in the capital. 
These organisations cooperated mostly with local environmental protection bureaus and 
functioned as their eyes and ears. Environmental protection bureaus are directly 
affiliated with the Ministry of Environmental Protection at regional level and their duty 
is to supervise implementation and management of provincial environmental protection.    
Animal protection was reported only by one organisation as their main activity and this 
organisation was interested in animal protection only in a general level. It promoted 
vegan and sustainable way of life. This is quite surprising since there is significant 
number of species on the verge of extinction in China due to the human impact. Perhaps 
this reflects the nature of environmental problems in China. The most severe problems 
that concerns especially urban population are lack of clean air and food safety, not 
animal welfare. Consequently, authorities are obviously more interested in cooperation 






I was able to receive budgetary information from 15 organisations. I divided the 
organisations into four categories according to the size of their budget. Five of the 
organisations were big in Chinese context. They had budget from one to five million 
RMB and usually had 20-30 paid workers. All the big organisations were located in 
Beijing. Medium-sized organisations had budgets from 500,000 to one million RMB 
and had 7-9 paid workers. All the medium-sized organisations were located in 
provincial capitals. Small organisations had budgets from 100,000 to 500,000 RMB. 
Three of them were located in Beijing and two in provincial capitals. Minuscule 
organisations had smaller than 100,000 RMB annual budgets. They were all located in 
provincial capitals. 
Total budget of all the organisations in the sample was nearly 17 million RMB of which 
two biggest organisations accounted for more than half (50.3%). Five biggest 
organisations in Beijing accounted for 73.6% of the total budget. On the other hand, five 
smallest organisations accounted only for 5.2% of the total budget and two smallest 
0.8%. When comparing the two extremes, the budget of the biggest organisation was 
158 times bigger than the budget of the smallest one. Thus, my sample covers small 
grassroots organisations and the biggest SOs in China. 




As can be seen from the figure 4 above, on average, organisations in Beijing had bigger 
annual budgets than organisations in the provinces. This was an expected result. Beijing 
as a national capital, and highly developed and prosperous area, attracts more domestic 
and international donors than less developed areas and thus social organisations there 
also have more funding opportunities. This was most visible among big organisations 
with annual budgets over one million RMB. Big SOs consisted 33% of the total in the 
sample and yet none of them were located outside Beijing.  
However, prosperity of the location in itself was not a significant explanatory factory in 
the organisations’ budgets since organisations in Shanghai and other rich provinces such 
as Zhejiang did not seem to receive the same share of prosperity as their equivalents in 
Beijing. The biggest provincial organisations in my sample were only medium-sized on 
national level comparison and there was no significant difference between rich east 
coast provinces and poor inland provinces. The only significant difference was between 
the capital city and provinces.  
 
Sources of Funding 
 
Organisations in my sample received funding from multiple sources ranging from 
international enterprises and foundations to domestic companies and local governments. 
Only the central government agencies did not provide any funding for the SOs in the 
sample. The most significant funding resource was international charities and 
foundations like the Ford Foundation, but almost as many of the SOs received financial 
support from domestic foundations. Domestic enterprises supported more often than 
international enterprises. One SO reported service fees and other SOs’ donations as their 
funding resource. I did not include service fees and other SOs’ donations in my 
questionnaire, so more organisations might get funding from these sources. However, it 
is not probable that service fees and other social organisations are substantial source of 




Figure 5) Funding sources 
Quite expectedly, organisations with bigger budgets had more diverse sources of 
funding and they also received funding from international actors more often than 
smaller organisations. Figure 5 presents the detailed information of funding sources. 
There are several major donors in my sample. The most notable international donors 
were the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Ford foundation, Waterkeeper Alliance and 
Oxfam. From international companies most frequently was mentioned the Coca-Cola 
Company, but wide range of different companies were mentioned from automobile 
manufacturers to financial and cosmetics companies such as BMW, Audi, HSBC, and 
Garnier. 
The most notable Chinese foundations mentioned in my sample were SEE foundation, 
One foundation, and Narada foundation. SEE foundation is founded by entrepreneurs in 
Beijing who were concerned with the desertification and sand storms in Beijing, but it 
was soon expanded to cover all kinds of environmental problems. It was founded in 
2004 and is the first foundation dedicated to environmental protection in China. One 
foundation, famously associated with the Chinese martial arts actor Jet Li, is closely 
related and inspired of SEE foundation. Many of the key personnel are same as in SEE 
foundation but it started with disaster and poverty relief, and aiding children of the poor 
families. One foundation is based in Shanghai and is funded by major Chinese 
corporations such as Tencent and Vanke Co.  
Narada foundation is founded by the Narada Group ltd in 2007, and its primary mission 
is to foster civil society in China. It is also the first foundation which provided grants 
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directly to grassroots organisations instead of funding its own projects. The President 
of Narada foundation is Xu Yongguang, the previous leader of the China Youth 
Development Foundation and initiator of the Project Hope. 
At the time of my study private foundations were not allowed to seek public donations. 
Private foundations had to operate with the funds their founding members had donated. 
From the foundations mentioned above, only One foundation was able to get status of 
public foundation which are allowed public fundraising. The 2016 Charity law made 
this distinction obsolete. It allowed foundations to register as charities and foundations 
which have held charitable organisations status for two years were granted to apply for 
public fundraising status. The new Foreign NGOs Management Law passed in the same 
year restricted foreign funding of domestic SOs. It is also expected that foreign 
foundations will withdraw their support from China as China is becoming more and 
more developed. These changes might have important implications for funding of SOs 
in China in the future and it is predicted that domestic foundations are gradually filling 
the gap which international foundations are leaving.  
 
Horizontal Ties to Other Social Organisations 
 
According to my hypothesis, the relations to other social organisations would not play 
an important role in their activities. However, most of the organisations reported 
cooperating with other social organisations. I did not research this feature in detail but 
the organisation I worked for cooperated with other SOs and this cooperation was 
coordinated more or less by a government-organised umbrella organisation.
146
 Same 
kind of pattern was found by Taru Salmenkari in her research. This kind of hierarchical 
pattern suits mass-line model well. Higher level organisation systemises information 
collected from below. According to Salmenkari, umbrella organisation might be also 
responsible for applying donations from abroad and then allocating them to the member 
organisations.
147
 Social organisations in Beijing were also actively organising seminars 
and journalist saloons where SOs shared information 
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Vertical Relations to Government Agencies 
 
As already mentioned, organisations’ connectedness and relations to the government 
organisations is the most important source of administrative legitimacy and the 
administrative legitimacy is the most important resource which organisations can use to 
develop their activities and their operational autonomy. Generally, the biggest 
organisations had wide connections to all sectors of society but only they had 
cooperation with central government agencies, mostly with Ministry of Environmental 
Protection (MEP). All but one of these organisations were located in Beijing. A 
Chongqing based organisation cooperated with national broadcasting company when 
revealing illegal logging in Sichuan province. Medium-sized organisations had 
cooperation with local governments and their offices or local bureaus of environmental 
protection. Small and miniscule organisations did not report any connections or 
cooperation with government offices.  
I also asked organisation's managers or leader’s background as it could indicate the 
possible relationship with government officials or other elite. Most of the organisations 
were founded by university professors or journalist. One small organisation was 
founded by members of other social organisation. None of the SOs reported that 
organisation was led or founded by retired governmental officers, but one was founded 
by a retired officer from the army. I expected there to be more retired cadres but this 
result might be due to the fact that my sample consisted only of a few officially 




As stated above, my main hypothesis was that Chinese social organisations gain 
operational autonomy not from independence from the state but quite contrary by 
actively cooperating with the state organisations and pursuing recognition and support 
from them. This way they gain administrative legitimacy and ability to develop their 
operations even if they were not formally registered. Therefore, there should be a strong 
positive correlation between administrative legitimacy and operational autonomy. 
Another important factor was financial independence. Without financial independence a 
SO is vulnerable to the co-optation by a governmental organisation and to lose its 
autonomy altogether. Therefore, there should also be strong positive correlation between 
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financial independence and operational autonomy. Lastly, I will demonstrate that 
financial independence is difficult to reach without first obtaining strong administrative 
legitimacy. Therefore, there should be a strong correlation between administrative 
legitimacy and financial independence. 
 
Administrative Legitimacy and Operational Autonomy 
 
First, I tested my hypothesis by comparing organisations administrative legitimacy to 
their operational autonomy. If any organisation would have represented weak 
administrative legitimacy but high degree of operational autonomy my hypothesis 
would have been directly refuted. As we can see from the figure 6 below, there were no 
such instances in my sample. All organisations which represented medium or high 
degree of operational autonomy represented also strong administrative legitimacy. 
However, strong administrative legitimacy does not mean that organisation should have 
high degree of operational autonomy. There are two instances of this sort in my sample 
as can be seen from the chart below (B4, SC1).  
This does not have to be a problem for my hypothesis. There are two reasons why this 
could happen. First, organisation could be so weak and dependant from governmental 
resources if it has been co-opted by the government organisation. As was described 
earlier, an organisation needs both governmental and private resources to fully actualise 
its potential. Second, since autonomy presupposes that organisation is able to make its 
own decisions regarding its goals and activity and my concept of operational autonomy 
comes observable only in the light of potential or existing opposition it is difficult to 
determine whether some organisations actually have autonomy. Thus, organisations 
aligning with governmental policies and interests could be able to set up their own 
agenda, but absence of opposition would make it invisible.  
The correlation coefficient r between administrative legitimation and operational 
autonomy is 0,69. Thus, the evidence shows that there is strong linear correlation 
between the variables. Strong correlation supports the idea that administrative 
legitimacy is necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, condition for operational 
autonomy. In other words, to gain operational autonomy, an organisation needs first to 
gain administrative legitimacy and only then it can develop and extend its sphere of 
activities. Coefficient of determination r2 is 47,1%.  Almost half of the observed 
outcomes are explained by the model, which is acceptable since my aim was not to 
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establish a causal connection between the variables but indicate that administrative 
legitimacy is part of necessary condition of obtaining operational autonomy. 
 
BJ=Beijing, SC=Sichuan, CQ=Chongqing, HN=Hunan, JS=Jiangsu, YN=Yunnan, ZJ=Zhejiang 
Figure 6) Administrative legitimacy an operational autonomy 
 
It is also clearly visible in the picture that organisations with strong administrative 
legitimacy (>2) are all located in Beijing. This is understandable. Organisations in 
Beijing have more opportunities to make contacts with central government officials and 
the leaders of organisations usually have these contacts already before they found an 
organisation. In fact, many of the SO leaders are high-ranking officials or retired 
ones148. However, in my sample only one of the organisation leader was retired army 
officer. Four of the leaders were university professors or academics and three of them 
were journalists. Four of the respondent reported another organisation as their leader’s 
background. 
Only one of the organisations with strong operational autonomy was officially 
registered with the local bureau of the Ministry of Civil Affairs. That was Chongqing 
based organisation (CQ1) founded by a retired army officer. Three of the SOs (BJ2, 
BJ5, BJ7) were Beijing based social service organisations and one of them (BJ6) was 
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affiliated with the Beijing University of Political Science. None of the formally 
registered social organisations were located in Beijing, so this would show that informal 
connections to central government agencies are more important source of operational 
autonomy than registration status alone. 
 
Financial Independence and Operational Autonomy 
 
As earlier mentioned, Sun Liping’s concept of dual nature of Chinese social 
organisations suggests, that organisations are also dependent on private resources. I 
tested operational autonomy with financial independence and found out that the pattern 
was similar to relation between administrative legitimacy and operational autonomy. 
Same organisations were on the top-right corner as in previous comparison. The 
correlation coefficient is r=0,6, showing that financial independence is positively 
correlated with operational autonomy. Coefficient of determination is r2=36% which is 
still acceptable. 
 
Figure 7 Financial independence and operational autonomy 
The same organisation (BJ4) which presented strong administrative legitimacy and low 
operational autonomy presented in this comparison high financial independence and 
low operational autonomy. This can be an anomaly to my hypothesis since the reason 
for its low operational autonomy cannot be the lack of private resources. However, this 
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proves only that financial independence might not be a sufficient condition for 
operational autonomy even together with strong administrative legitimacy. It still can 
be part of the necessary condition. The main activity of the organisation (BJ4) is 
scientific research. Scientific research does not demonstrate much operational 
autonomy. On Diamond’s scale149, scientific research would be on level 2 or 3, that is, 
changing information and achieving common goals. Of course, depending on research 
topic, scientific research can be political in nature but that would need more careful 
study of its nature. However, the reason for its lack of operational autonomy is beyond 
my topic as my hypothesis predicts that only when organisation has strong 
administrative legitimacy and financial independence it can develop its autonomy to full 
potential.  
 
Administrative Legitimacy and Financial Independence 
 
Even though most of the financial resources of social organisations come from the 
private sector, their distribution is heavily influenced by administrative legitimacy. As 
figure 8 shows there is a positive correlation between administrative legitimacy and 
financial independence. The correlation coefficient is r=0,7 which demonstrates strong 
linear correlation. The coefficient of determination is =48,5% which is acceptable. 
                                                 




Figure 8) Administrative legitimacy and financial independence 
Stronger organisation’s administrative legitimacy is, the higher its financial 
independence, that is, organisations with strong administrative legitimacy tend to have 

















My research question was how Chinese social organisations are able to decide their own 
agenda and operate autonomously under an authoritarian regime. Many Western 
scholars have based their research of Chinese civil society on the civil society and 
corporatist models or some kind of mix of them. These models share the common 
feature that they consider organisations autonomy as independence from the state or as 
organisational autonomy. This conception links the degree of organisation’s autonomy 
to its connectedness to the government in a straightforward way. The further away 
organisation is structurally from the government, more autonomous it is. These models 
are not able to provide satisfactory theoretical framework to my research question and, 
quite contrary, they make predictions which are contrary to the empirical observations. 
In China, social organisations gain legitimacy and autonomy by cooperating with 
government agencies. Thus, mass line model is a more appropriate model for Chinese 
civil society.  
Connectedness to the government is conceptualised in the concept of administrative 
legitimacy. Administrative legitimacy is the most important resource of Chinese social 
organisations. It is the prerequisite to achieve full legitimacy and it is also prerequisite 
for social and private resources.  
However, mass line model is incompatible with organizational autonomy and 
operational autonomy is more fruitful concept to measure social organisations actual 
autonomy and ability to decide their agendas. Research data supports my hypothesis 
that to achieve operational autonomy, organisation needs to gain administrative 
legitimacy first. There were no instances of weak administrative legitimacy and strong 
operational autonomy. However, according to my hypothesis, administrative legitimacy 
is not sufficient in itself but organisation needs also social and private resources to gain 
autonomy. This hypothesis was also supported by the data although there was a SO 
(BJ4) which presented strong administrative legitimacy and financial independence, yet 
weak operational autonomy. This is possible for two reasons. Either that SO was co-
opted and did not have autonomy or there is some unclarity in the operationalisation of 
Diamond’s model.  My conception of operational autonomy comes visible only in the 
light of actual or potential opposition. Some activities, such as scientific research, are 
difficult to place in Diamond’ model. Scientific research is just a means which can be 
used for achieving common goals, exchanging information, or scientific knowledge can 
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be used to advocate specific policies. Therefore, is difficult to define and operationalize 
it in measurable terms so that one is able to distinguish whether it presents strong 
operational autonomy or not. One needs to investigate more carefully what is the 
organisation’s purpose of doing research.  
Same goes with policy advocacy. In general, I have defined it as an activity presenting 
strong operational autonomy. A SO may report to be engaging in policy advocacy, but 
policy advocacy can range from one extreme where SO is pushing new ideas to the 
agenda of governmental officials to the other extreme where SO is just anticipating 
which kind of ideas would be more pleasant for the Party. My operationalisation is not 
very sensitive in this respect, although I have distinguished policy advocacy at different 
level of administration as presenting different levels of operational autonomy. Thus, an 
in-depth study must pay more concern for SOs and their activities. 
In overall these concepts are exact enough to show that there is positive correlation 
between administrative legitimacy, operational autonomy and financial independence 
which is the base for the concept of dependent autonomy.  These concepts give more 
fruitful starting point to study Chinese social organisations’ autonomy and predict 
their performance than concept of organisational autonomy. 
One result which was surprisingly strong was the relation between administrative 
legitimacy and financial independence. The operationalisation of concepts almost 
conceals how strong influence administrative legitimacy has on SOs private donations. 
Very few donors gave money to grassroots organisations and most money was given to 
those with good connections to the government. Close links to the government are not 
important only in the eyes of government officials but also private citizens and donors. 
In other words, engaging in mass line style of relationships with the government is 
important also from the point of view of society and donors.  
It is an interesting question why the Chinese donors favour SOs with governmental ties. 
Undoubtedly, institutional pressures play an important role in their granting. Chinese 
private foundations also tend rather to build up their own projects than grant money to 
grassroots organisations150. I suggest that SOs with governmental ties are also seen 
more trustworthy and capable to fulfil their objects. This is close to the idea what Lu 
Yiyi meant by the notion of legitimacy in the eyes of society
151
 and which I already 
                                                 
150 Teets 2017 
151 Lu 2009, 54, 55 
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elaborated in chapter on social legitimacy. Bruce Dickson has pointed out interesting 
fact that Chinese are often suspicious towards social organisations. In 2010 and 2014 
surveys 65% of the respondents regarded SOs as threats to social harmony. When 
people were asked who they trusted, only 38% trusted social organisations. SOs ranked 
well below government officials. According to same survey almost 80% of the 
respondents trusted central leaders and then trust gradually decreased when coming to 
provincial and local leaders.152  
In this regard, the future implications of the new Charity Law are very interesting. 
According to the law, foundations may register as public charities which are allowed to 
seek public donations. More diverse donor base might lead foundations in future to 
grant money more equally to grassroots organisation too. However, the public opinion 
seems to set boundaries to this positive development unless there will be changes in 
public opinion on SOs’ trustworthiness. 
It is not only Chinese donors that favour organisations with strong ties to the 
government but also foreign grant-making foundations. Anthony J. Spires has studied 
US-based foundations and claims that this is due to ‘organisational homophily’, that is, 
a process where institutional demands from both China and the USA and preferences of 
elite-led foundations from USA converge to disadvantage of grassroots organisations.
153 
Charity law coupled with the new Foreign NGOs Management Law and foreign 
foundations tendency of moving their granting to developing countries will have 
significant implications on funding of Chinese SOs in the near future. Domestic 
foundations will take more important role in funding when they are filling the gap 
which international foundations are leaving. More heteronomous donor base perhaps 
will give voice for marginalised groups. It will be an interesting topic for future research 
how these changes will affect in Chinese SOs’ autonomy and development. 
Mass line style of relation between society and government can cherish plurality of 
opinion and autonomous social organisations, and that way increase the openness of the 
Chinese governance. However, it still has its limitations. The requirement of political 
correctness which is inherently in the system effectively prevents any criticism of the 
system itself. Thus, it is difficult to see that growing pluralism and autonomy of the 
                                                 
152 Dickson 2016, 141 
153 Spires 2011, 305 
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social organisations has any significant influence on democratisation or accountability 
of the leaders. 
I concentrated my study on environmental SOs which might raise questions whether my 
results are applicable to other sectors of civil society. I restricted the scope of my study 
in environmental social organisations for the sake of simplicity. In environmental 
protection the conflict of interest is mostly between the central government which 
passes environmental laws and local governments which might be reluctant to 
implement those laws in full. In other sectors conflict of interest might be elsewhere and 
social organisations may have difficulties to find powerful allies and thus develop their 
autonomy. Nevertheless, mass line model is still applicable to all social organisations 
whether they are fully co-opted, are in corporatist relation with the state or are 
grassroots organisations.     
The evidence I presented supports the hypothesis that participating in the mass line style 
of relation with the government organisations and officials enables social organisations 
to achieve relatively strong operational autonomy. I call it dependent autonomy because 
it is achieved through participation and is strongly dependent on governmental 
recognition and support. Besides governmental recognition, Chinese SOs need to obtain 
financial independence to achieve operational autonomy. This Chinese SOs’ dualist 
nature is compatible with the mass line model since financial independence is also 
strongly dependent on governmental recognition. Thus, dependent autonomy is complex 
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( ) 政府组建 
( ) 民办组建 
- 请问贵机构目前的注册身份？请选择合适选项 （单选题）。 
( ) 民政部下属社会团体 
( ) 民政部下属非企业单位 
( ) 民政部下属分支机构 
( ) 大学内部机构 
( ) 在工商局注册的商业机构 
( ) 基层组织 
( ) 其他,请具体说明:                                                                           
- 请问您贵机构主要的活动业务有哪些(可多选)？ 
( ) 环境保护 
( ) 环保教育 
( ) 环保宣传活动 
( ) 动物救助和保护 
( ) 生产能力建设支持 
( ) 环保政策宣传 
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( ) 公司监督部门, 促进企业社会责任 
( ) 科学研究 
( ) 社区服务 
( ) 社区发展 
( ) 为环境污染受害者提供法律援助 
( ) 其他,请具体说明:                                                                           
 
- 请问贵机构的工作人员属于以下哪些选项？请提供对应的员工人数。 
( ) 全职薪酬员工, 人数      
( ) 临时薪酬员工, 人数      
( ) 志愿者(无薪酬), 人数     
- 请问贵机构的运作资金来源于何处？ 
( ) 中央政府 
( ) 地方政府 
( ) 国际商业公司 
( ) 国内商业公司 
( ) 国际慈善机构或者国际慈善基金会 
( ) 慈善机构或者国内慈善基金会 
( ) 其他，请具体说明:                                                                        
- 请问贵机构每年的预算是多少？请选择以下合适的选项。  
( ) 小于 10万元 
( ) 10万 – 50万 
( ) 50万 – 100万 
( ) 大于 100万 
- 请问贵机构是否与中国的中央政府或者所在地的当地政府有相关的合作往来？例如，中
国环境保护部。请选择以下合适的选项，并提供和合作相关机构的名称。 
( ) 有，请提供机构名称:                                                                    
( ) 没有 
- 请问贵机构是否与私人企业有相关的合作往来？请选择合适的选项，并提供合作机构的
名称。 
( ) 有，合作私人企业的名称:                                                            
( ) 没有 
- 请问贵机构与其他非政府组织是否有合作往来？ 
( ) 有，合作机构名称:                                                                        
( ) 没有 
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- 请问贵机构的创建人或领导人的背景属于以下哪个选项 （单选）？ 
( ) 中央政府或地方政府官员 
( ) 公立大学 
( ) 记者或者其他传媒工作者 
( ) 商务人士 
( ) 事业单位工作人员 









( ) 非常成功  
( ) 成绩良好，还有很多改进的地方  
( ) 马马虎虎，请您简略地说明原因:                                                
 
 
- 请问贵机构在未来面对的最大的挑战是什么？ 
 
 
 
 
 
- 恳请您在下方空白处分享您对于我研究的课题的一些其他想法或者建议。非常感谢您对
我学术研究的大力支持和无私的帮助。 
 
 
